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CORNELL STUDIES

IN

CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

EDITED BY

BENJAMIN IDE WHEELER, CHARLES EDWIN BENNETT,
AND GEORGE PRENTICE BRISTOL

No. IX

CRITIQUE OF SOME RECENT SUBJUNCTIVE THEORIES

BY

CHARLES EDWIN BENNETT

PUBLISHED FOR THE UNIVERSITY

BY

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1898

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
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PREFACE.

The matter of the following chapters was put into its present form in September and October of the current year. I regret that the printing of Chapter iv (on the force of tenses in the Prohibitive) was completed before the appearance on this side of the Atlantic of the December issue of the *CLASSICAL REVIEW*, in which Geddes promises a treatment of the same subject.

Professor John C. Rolfe, of the University of Michigan, and Mr. Charles L. Durham, of Cornell University, have rendered generous and efficient assistance during the printing of this volume.

CHARLES EDWIN BENNETT.

ITHACA, N. Y., Dec. 7, 1898.

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CHAPTER I.

ELMER'S THEORY OF A 'SUBJUNCTIVE OF OBLIGATION OR PROPRIETY.'

In Vol. XV of the *American Journal of Philology*, Elmer advanced the view that certain subjunctives hitherto regarded as prohibitive in character and referred for their origin to the Indo-European subjunctive in its 'will' phase, were improperly so explained and ought rather to be referred to the Indo-European optative in its 'contingent-future' ('should', 'would') phase. To the same category were assigned, also, many expressions previously regarded as deliberatives, (both affirmative and negative), and also some ordinarily taken as hortatory. In a later work (*Studies in Latin Moods and Tenses*, CORNELL STUDIES, Vol. vi, pp. 214-227), the foregoing principles are re-stated and given a somewhat wider application. The paper in which this theory was announced showed much painstaking research and no little ingenuity; yet the author's conclusions have always seemed to me unsound. Several of his premises are untrue and much of the reasoning contained in the paper I cannot help regarding as fallacious. Elmer starts with expressions of which the following is the type: Cic. *Acad.* ii, 46, 141, *Nihil igitur me putatis moveri? Tam moveor quam tu, Luculle, nec me minus hominem quam te putaveris.* Previous scholars had uniformly regarded this and similar expressions as genuine prohibitives and rendered our passage as 'and do not think.' Elmer's view is that it was not prohibitive, but that it meant 'you ought not to think', a force which, he maintains, was an outgrowth of the earlier 'you would not think (*sc.* if you were to do the right thing)',—one of the two values recognized as belonging to the Indo-European optative, and popularly called 'Potential.' To this usage Elmer applies the designation of 'Subjunctive of

Obligation or Propriety.' His grounds for abandoning the traditional explanation of this and similar passages, are several in number; yet all centre about the employment of the negative. How is it, he asks, that we find *neque* (*nec*) with expressions of this sort, if they are really prohibitive? The prohibitive subjunctive is regularly accompanied by *ne* (not *non*), and where co-ordination is desired, by *neve* (*neu*) not by *neque* (*nec*). This being so, the presence of *neque* (*nec*) ought, he claims, to rouse suspicion as to the real prohibitive character of any subjunctive in whose company it is discovered. Our current manuals, it is admitted, do recognize the occasional tendency of the prohibitive to ally itself with an illegitimate consort,—*neque* instead of *neve*,—but Elmer's contention is that no such exceptional use of *neque* for *neve* is to be admitted, and that the appearance of *neque* on the scene is to be regarded as *prima facie* evidence that the subjunctive which it accompanies is not prohibitive in character. Elmer's belief, further, is that "our best starting point in attempting to discover to what extent *neque* (*nec*) was used in prohibitives will be found in expressions whose prohibitive character is beyond all question, *viz.*, expressions in which the verb is in the imperative, or, if in the subjunctive, is preceded by another verb which is itself introduced by *ne* or *neve*. The use of *ne* or *neve* will show beyond all possibility of doubt that the mood of the verb is volitive [*i. e.*, prohibitive] in character."

In applying these principles the author first inquires: "What is to be said, then, of the use of *neque* (*nec*) with the imperative prior to the period of Cicero?" . . . "Merely this, that it does not once occur." But in the Spoletium inscription of the early part of the 2d century B. C., we find a clear instance of the very use that Elmer denies (*C. I. L.*, xi. 4766) *honce loucom ne quis violatod neque exvehito neque exferto quod louci siet neque cedito nesei quo die res deina anua fiet*. Whether other instances occur or not I do not know. At best they can hardly be frequent, but it is important to note that *neque* with the imperative does occur in the ante-Ciceronian era. An instance occurs also in Cicero himself, *ad Att.* xii, 22, 3, *habe tuum negotium nec, quid res mea familiaris postulet, quam ego non curo, sed quid velim*

existima.¹ Ordinarily with the imperative *neve* was used, being found as many as 121 times in early laws. Yet outside of the laws neither *neque* nor *neve* would appear to be common. Elmer cites but two instances of *neve* with the imperative from literary sources.

From his examination of the negative employed with the imperative, Elmer next turns to a consideration of *neque* (*nec*) used in prohibitions expressed by the subjunctive, urging that "we can be sure that the subjunctive in such cases is hortatory [prohibitive] in character only when *ne* or *neve* (*neu*) has preceded. How often, then," he inquires, "does *neque* (*nec*) occur in such clearly prohibitive uses of the subjunctive mood? Not once," is the answer, "in prose from the earliest times till after the Augustan period and only once in direct address in poetry." This instance is found in Horace, *Od.* i, 11, *tu ne quaesieris . . . nec temptaris*. In a foot-note Elmer also recognizes the usage for the third person as early as Catullus (61, 126) *Ne diu taceat procax Fescennina iocatio, Nec nuce pueris neget*, but offers the explanation that it is a rare poetic license. This seems to me a questionable endeavor to minimize the significance of the idiom for Catullus's day. But, however that may be, Elmer has overlooked several striking examples of the very usage he denies, and in authors much earlier than Catullus, *viz.*, Plautus and Terence. In the *Asinaria*, within a compass of 25 lines, occur nine instances of *neque* (*nec*) with the prohibitive subjunctive in the most intimate association with subjunctives accompanied by *ne*. I give the passage in full (767 ff.):

' Ne illi sit cera, ubi facere possit litteras.
Vocet convivam neminem illa : tu voces.
Ad eorum ne quem oculos adiciat suos :
Si quem alium aspexit, caeca continuo siet.
Tecum una postea aequae pocula potitet,

¹Elmer (p. 160) has not overlooked this passage, but denies that *nec* negatives the idea of *existima*. The meaning, he asserts, is 'Think not this but that.' I cannot so feel the passage. To my mind the *nec* naturally goes with *existima* and to dissociate it from that word seems to me a forcing of the interpretation for the purpose of securing support for a theory.

4 *The Subjunctive of Obligation or Propriety.*

Abs ted accipiat, tibi propinet, tu bibas,
Ne illa minus aut plus quam tu sapiat.' DI. Satis placet.

PA. 'Suspiciones omnis ab se segreget.
Neque illaec ulli * pede pedem homini premat,
Quom surgat : neque * in lectum inscendat proximum,
Neque quom descendat inde, det quoiquam manum.
Spectandum ne quoi * anulum det neque roget.
Talos * ne quoiquam homini admoueat nisi tibi.
Quom iaciat, 'te' ne dicat, nomen nominet.
Deam invocet sibi quam lubebit propitiam,
Deum nullum : si magis religiosa fuerit,
Tibi dicat ; tu pro illa ores ut sit propitius,
Neque illa ulli homini nutet nictet annuat.
Post si lucerna extincta sit, nequid sui
Membri commoueat quicquam in tenebris.'

In verse 792 the prohibitives are resumed :

'Neque ullum verbum faciat perplexabile
Neque ulla lingua sciat loqui nisi Attica.
Fors si tussire occepsit, ne sic tussiat,
Ut quoiquam linguam in tussiendo proserat :
Quod illa autem simulet quasi gravedo profluat,
Hoc ne sic faciat : tu labellum abstergeas
Potius quam quoiquam savium faciat palam,
Nec mater lena ad vinum accedat interim
Nec ulli verbo male dicat : si dixerit,
Haec multa ei esto.

Terence also has a passage, *Eun.* 74 f. :

Quid agas ? nisi ut te redimas captum quam queas
Minumo : si nequeas paululo, at quanti queas.
Et ne te adffictes. PH. Itane suades ? PA. Si sapis.
Neque, praeter quam quas ipse amor molestias
Habet, addas, et illas quas habet recte feras !

Whether there are other passages of the same sort in Early Latin I cannot say. For Plautus I am ready to assert that I do

not believe there are. Yet the ten instances just cited seem to me to furnish an unsurmountable obstacle to any one who insists on upholding the theory that *neque* was not from the earliest times associated (at least occasionally) with the prohibitive subjunctive, just as we have seen that it might also be associated with the imperative.

Elmer next proceeds to urge that "A striking proof that this use of the perfect subjunctive with *nec* is a construction entirely distinct from that of *ne* with the same mood and tense, is found in the fact that certain writers who never use the latter at all are wont to make frequent use of the former." Ovid, Virgil, Tibullus, and Propertius are cited as illustrations. But it is difficult to see anything remarkable in this. Assuming that instances of *neque* (*nec*) with the perfect subjunctive are really prohibitive, we simply gather that for some reason these poets employed one form of prohibition to the exclusion of another. This is, beyond question, an interesting feature of style, but it is perfectly consistent with the existence of scores of other analogous idiosyncrasies in every language. Cf., for example, with Plautus's twenty-seven¹ instances of *ne* with the perfect subjunctive the fact that in five plays of Terence the construction does not once occur. Yet Elmer's own investigation seems to give a clue to the correct explanation of the absence of *ne* with the perfect subjunctive from the four poets just named. His results show beyond question that *ne* with the perfect subjunctive in prohibition was essentially a colloquialism. It was not characteristic of the lofty style; hence its absence from the highly artistic productions of the Augustan poets should occasion no surprise. Its practical absence also from Cicero's orations (Elmer, p. 305), I should account for in the same way.

Elmer next adduces considerations which are held to constitute even more striking evidence of the correctness of his thesis. In his study of *ne* with the perfect subjunctive in prohibitions

¹Elmer gives the number as twenty-nine. But he has included six examples that must be excluded, and has omitted four other examples. See below, Chapter IV.

6 *The Subjunctive of Obligation or Propriety.*

(*American Journal of Philology*, xv. p. 146), it was shown that in this type of prohibition relatively few instances of verbs expressing mental activity occur.¹ Yet among the thirty-eight instances of *neque* (*nec*) with the perfect subjunctive occurring from the earliest times to the end of the Augustan era, somewhat more than one third are of verbs denoting mental activity. This contrast is held to be highly significant, so much so as to point to a different origin for the two types (*ne* with the perfect subjunctive, and *neque* (*nec*) with the perfect subjunctive). I can hardly admit the legitimacy of this reasoning. It is perfectly true that in prohibitions expressed by *ne* with the perfect subjunctive few verbs denoting mental activities occur; it is also true, as just stated, that among the instances of *neque* (*nec*) with the perfect subjunctive quite a number of the verbs do express mental activity. But we must recall the fact that most of the instances of *ne* with the perfect subjunctive occur in Plautus and Terence,² while most of the instances of *neque* (*nec*) with the perfect subjunctive occur in authors subsequent to Plautus and Terence. To my mind it is not difficult to account for the discrepancy to which Elmer attaches so much significance. The discrepancy at most is somewhat slighter than might at first appear. For of the fifteen instances (out of thirty-eight) of verbs of mental action in the perfect subjunctive with *neque* (*nec*), eight occur in a single writer, Ovid, and of these eight, five are *nec credideris*, and two are *nec putaris*, while *nec putaveris* occurs also in Cicero.

Elmer's position now is this: In Plautus and Terence *ne* with the *perfect* subjunctive in prohibitions is not used in the case of verbs denoting mental activity. In the same authors the *present* subjunctive in prohibitions does occur with some frequency in the case of just such verbs, *e. g.*, *ne censeas* (repeatedly), *ne credas*. This being so, Ovid, a century and a half later, assuming that he would naturally have expressed a prohi-

¹ Elmer even maintains that no such instances occur; but see below, Chapter IV.

² Nominally the entire period from Plautus to the end of the Augustan period is under consideration, but the material is chiefly confined to these two writers.

bition by means of *neque* (*nec*) with the perfect subjunctive, should, according to Elmer, have followed precisely the same selection of words. Is this a fair conclusion? Is it not based on the untenable assumption that language must always go on as it is, without capacity for development or extension beyond its condition at any one period? Were this principle to be carried out, we should never have had any subordinate clauses or any abstract designations in any language. Is it not perfectly simple and natural to explain Ovid's repeated *nec credideris* and *nec putaris* as purely the result of an invasion of the perfect by words originally confined chiefly to the present? This explanation seems all the more probable when we consider that even in Plautus verbs of mental activity do occur in prohibitions expressed by the perfect. An analogous phenomenon would be presented in the use of the Genitive of Quality and the Ablative of Quality. Originally the Genitive of Quality was restricted to permanent characteristics, the Ablative to transitory ones; yet as time goes on we find the Ablative invading the domain of the Genitive. A living language is never stable. The folk-consciousness is perpetually striving for variety; and the possibilities for innovation are particularly numerous in the case of constructions already connected by some psychological bond. I therefore see no difficulty in believing that a century and a half of growth in the Latin language might easily have given rise to the somewhat freer employment, in prohibitions, of the perfect subjunctive of verbs denoting mental activities. Even rejecting this possibility, Elmer's argument could hold at most only for the fifteen instances of *neque* (*nec*) with the perfect of verbs of mental activity. The remaining twenty-three instances of *neque* (*nec*) with the perfect subjunctive would still be naturally taken as prohibitive, unless we were to proceed upon the principle that in any grammatical category emanating presumably from a single source, the key to its origin is to be sought in the small minority of its manifestations rather than in the majority.

Elmer now professes to see but one possible support left for those who would maintain the prohibitive character of *neque* (*nec*) clauses in the subjunctive. It is this. It is generally admitted

that the purpose clause is a development of the jussive and prohibitive. This being so, negative purpose clauses are normally introduced by *ne* (the regular negative of the jussive-prohibitive), or by *neve* (*neu*), if a second negative purpose clause be co-ordinated with one already expressed. All scholars hitherto have, however, felt compelled to recognize occasional exceptions to the principle touching the use of *neve* (*neu*), and have admitted the occasional use of *neque* (*nec*) for *neve* (*neu*) in the second of two co-ordinated purpose clauses. This admission has been made for Cicero as well as other writers. Elmer observes: "Now some one may say, if Cicero uses *neque* (*nec*) at all in expressions of the will, as in purpose clauses, [in origin really dependent jussives and prohibitives], there is no reason why he should not use it in *any* volitive expression [as, for example, such assumed prohibitives as the *neque* (*nec*) clauses under discussion]." Elmer himself questions whether this conclusion would be a fair one to draw from these premises, assuming their correctness. Yet he deems it worth while to attempt a lengthy refutation of the premises with the evident intent of forestalling or invalidating any conclusion which might be based upon them by others. Elmer, then, denies that the second of two co-ordinated purpose clauses is ever introduced by *neque* (*nec*) in the writings of Cicero. His argument is as follows: "Every purpose clause is, at the same time, a result clause as well. When a man says: 'I wish to train my children properly that they may, in after years, be honored citizens,' their being honored citizens is, to be sure, the purpose of his training, but it may also be conceived of merely as the future result of that training. The use of the word 'that' instead of 'so that,' and 'may' instead of 'will,' shows that in this particular instance the purpose idea is probably uppermost in the mind of the speaker. Suppose now he says: 'I wish to train my children properly, *so that* (*i. e.*, to train them in such a way that) they will, in after years, be honored citizens.' The two sentences practically mean the same thing, and one might at any time be substituted for the other; but in the second, the substitution of 'so that' and 'will' shows that the feeling uppermost in the mind is that of result."

I have given Elmer's words in full, since the principle involved in them seems to me to be of such vast import, if the author's contention be sound. But is it? The broad, general assertion is made that every purpose-clause is at the same time a result clause as well. The presumption is that the words 'purpose' and 'result' in this proposition are employed in their accepted grammatical senses. If not so employed, the proposition is pointless. If they are so employed, then, apparently, we are to understand that such an English sentence as "He visits the President in order to secure an appointment," means that he secures the appointment, and so on. In other words, purpose involves accomplishment of the purpose. But the author gives no proof that such is the case. What he does show is simply this, that in English there are two forms (to say nothing of others) of expressing the purpose notion: 'that they may,' and 'so that they will.' Both of these expressions in English, I submit to any candid judge, are logically purpose expressions. The English 'so that' does not necessarily imply result in English, though it often does. In the present instance it denotes purpose as exclusively and solely, as does the English 'so as to' in 'Aim low, so as not to fire above their heads,' though 'so as to' is frequently employed to denote result. We have the same thing in Greek. Purpose is commonly expressed in that language by *ὥς* with the subjunctive (optative) and by relatives with the future indicative, yet at times we have *ὥστε* with the infinitive (primarily an expression of result) employed to denote purpose. But the fact that in Greek and English certain expressions primarily employed to denote result (in the grammatical sense) are employed occasionally to denote purpose, proves nothing except that one syntactical mechanism may take on new functions. In this instance, it is clear that in English and Greek, the mechanism employed to denote result is occasionally employed to denote purpose; but it by no means follows from that, that every purpose clause in any language is logically a result clause as well, or even that any purpose clause in any language is at the same time a result clause. Elmer proceeds: "It accordingly very frequently happens that it is impossible to determine whether a clause introduced by *ut*

is to be classed as a purpose clause or a result clause." As an example he cites: *Conscios interfecit ut suum scelus celaretur*. But I cannot see that either the general principle just invoked or the illustration of it has the slightest bearing on the point at issue. That point is, whether every purpose clause is a result clause as well. It may happen frequently that it is difficult to determine whether a given clause is a purpose clause or a result clause. It may be that *ut . . . celaretur* in the sentence quoted is ambiguous, though I fail to see why it should be. All that, however, is immaterial. *Ut . . . celaretur* must mean either one thing or another. The context must determine, and between the two ideas 'in order that his crime might be concealed' and 'so that his crime was concealed', there exists as wide a gulf as between any two conceivable logical relations.

Elmer further holds: "it often happens that what precedes would lead one to expect that a result clause is to follow, when a final clause actually does follow. Such a sentence is found, for instance, in Ter. *Phormio*, 975, *Hisce ego illam dictis ita tibi incensam dabo ut ne restinguas, lacrimis si exstilareris*. "The expression *ita tibi incensam dabo*," he continues, "('I will render her so enraged at you') might lead one to expect the thought to be completed by a clause of result, *viz.*, *ut non restinguas*, etc." But the sentence does not convey that meaning to me; I doubt whether it ought to to any one. To my mind *ita* does not contain the intensive notion of 'so.' As I read the first clause, I get an idea from the *ita* which corresponds most nearly perhaps to the English 'with this object in view', 'with this intention', and the *ut ne restinguas* follows naturally in explanation. This employment of *ita* is so common in all periods as hardly to call for illustration. Kühner, *Ausf. Gr.*, ii. p. 822, Anm. 4, gives an abundance of examples. Whether the intensive *ita* in correlation with a following *ut* clause occurs in Early Latin with adjectives and adverbs, I very much doubt, though I cannot absolutely verify my skepticism. Of the several passages referred to by Elmer as cited by Brix in his note on Plautus, *Mil. Glo.* 149, not one, in my judgment, gives warrant for the view that a sentence shifts from one of result to one of

purpose. My general attitude toward all these sentences will appear from a discussion of the second in Brix's list, Plautus, *Capt.* 738, *Atque hunc me velle dicite ita curarier, ne qui deterius huic sit quam quoi pessumest.* Here again *ita* is not a particle of degree ('in such a manner'), but it is precisely like the *ita* of the Terence passage, and means 'on this principle', 'with this object in view'. The other examples cited by Brix all yield naturally to a similar interpretation. I therefore fail to see that any case is made out which supports Elmer's contention that *ne* clauses are common (or even once occur) under circumstances in which we should expect result clauses, *i. e.*, in Latin. Equally untenable is the view, which Elmer next proceeds to develop, that the contrary is also true, *viz.*, that result clauses are occasionally found where *ne*-clauses would be naturally expected. Let us turn to the examples cited in support of this doctrine. One of these is Cic., *in Caecil.* 16, 52, *qui si te recte monere volet, suadebit tibi ut hinc discedas neque mihi verbum ullum respondeas.* Elmer translates: 'will advise you in such a way as to result in your departing without saying a word in reply.' But such cannot be the sense of the passage. As the context clearly shows (*qui si te recte monere volet*), the passage must mean: 'if he gives you good advice, his advice will be to go away and keep still about it.' Would it not be extremely unnatural, not to say impossible, to speak of advising anybody in such a way that he departs? Moreover the explanation of *neque . . . respondeas* as a result clause carries with it the implication that in Latin one might expect to find *tibi suadeo . . . ut non respondeas*, which confessedly never occurs. The same criticism applies to Elmer's explanation of Cic. *in Verr.* ii. 2, 17, 41, *Illi eum commonefaciunt ut utatur instituto suo nec cogat ante horam decimam de absente secundum praesentem iudicare: impetrant.* Elmer translates: 'they earnestly plead with him, with the result that he follows his usual custom and does not compel.' But does not the context clearly show that Cicero merely means to say: 'they urge him to follow and not to compel'? If it means 'they urge, with the result that he does follow and does not compel', what possible sense can there be in Cicero's adding *im-*

petrant? By Elmer's interpretation, this word becomes entirely superfluous. Moreover, if *nec cogat* be a result clause, we should expect at least an occasional *commonefacio ut non cogas*,—a construction which never occurs.

Precisely the same line of argument might be directed against Elmer's remaining examples cited in support of his thesis. Without exception they are all either pure purpose clauses or substantive clauses developed from the Jussive. Possibly we should except *de Off.* i. 29, 102, *Efficiendum autem est ut appetitus rationi oboediant eamque neque praecurrant nec propter pigritiam aut ignaviam deserant.* *Efficere* often takes a substantive clause of result, as well as a substantive clause of volitive origin, and if it does so here, it is of no significance whatever. I cannot, however, refrain from discussing one other example mentioned by Elmer under this head. It is from Cicero's *Laelius*, 11, 37, *Nulla est igitur excusatio peccati, si amici causa peccaveris; nam, cum conciliatrix amicitiae virtutis opinio fuerit, difficile est amicitiam manere, si a virtute defeceris . . . (11, 39) aequae autem nefas sit tale aliquid et facere rogatum et rogare . . . (12, 40) Haec igitur lex in amicitia sancitur, ut neque rogemus res turpis nec faciamus rogati.* Elmer observes: "This *ut* clause has been wrongly explained as volitive in character, because *haec lex* has been supposed to look forward to the *ut* clause, and *rogemus* and *faciamus* have been looked upon as representing the hortatory [*i. e.*, jussive] subjunctive of the *lex*. But the whole burden of the thought in the preceding chapter has been that one should never do wrong even for a friend. *Haec lex* looks backward to the principle there laid down, and the meaning is 'Let this of which we have spoken, be an established principle in friendship, so that we shall not (*i. e.*, with the result that we shall not) ask a friend to do wrong, nor do it ourselves when asked.' To me this interpretation seems to do violence to the sense. I cannot conceive that it could be natural to speak of having a principle so that we shall not do certain things. All of us have good enough principles, but they do not keep us from acting at variance with them, and I imagine it was much the same in ancient times.

Moreover, we cannot refuse to admit the significance of an expression like the following, as bearing directly on the character of the type of clauses I have just been discussing: Nepos, *Paus.* 4, 6. *Modo magis Pausanias perturbatus orare coepit, ne enuntiaret nec se meritum de illo optime proderet.* Here the *ne* in the first clause is decisive as to the character of *nec* in the second.

I intentionally pass over Elmer's discussion of sentences of the type: *Nunc ut hoc tempore ea . . . praetermittam neque eos appellem, a quibus omne frumentum eripuit, etc.* (Cic. *in Verr.*, ii. 3, 48, 115). For it seems to me that we have already sufficiently shown that there subsists no valid reason for refusing to recognize the existence in Cicero's writings of *neque* in the second of two coördinated volitive subjunctives, not only in purpose clauses, but also in substantive clauses developed from the jussive and prohibitive. I forbear, for the same reason, to discuss several instances of clauses introduced by *neque* (*nec*) where Elmer claims that the negative spends its force upon a single word, and does not belong to the verb, though in several cases, at least, I should dissent from his conclusions touching these passages.

We are now at the end of our consideration of the arguments advanced by Elmer against the traditional explanation as prohibitives of Cic. *Acad.* ii. 46,* 141. *nec . . . putaveris* and similar expressions. It may, therefore, be well briefly to recapitulate his objections. They were five in number;

1. It was denied that prior to the Ciceronian period *neque* was ever found connecting imperatives. This statement was shown to be erroneous. Examples were cited from an inscription; also from Cicero himself.

2. It was claimed that *neque* (*nec*) with the jussive subjunctive was not found connected with prohibitives accompanied by *ne*. This statement was likewise shown to be erroneous. Nine instances of the usage denied were cited from one play of Plautus, and one instance from Terence.

3. It was claimed that the absence of *ne* with the perfect subjunctive in prohibitions in the Augustan poets is inconsistent with the existence of perfect subjunctives with *neque* (*nec*) em-

ployed as prohibitives. In reply to this, it was pointed out that this preference for one form of expression to the exclusion of another might be only a natural, and in this particular instance an easily explained, idiosyncrasy.

4. Among the thirty-eight instances of *neque* (*nec*) with the perfect subjunctive hitherto regarded by all scholars as prohibitives, it was noted that something like one-third were of verbs denoting mental activity, which in Plautus are not so frequently employed in the perfect subjunctive with *ne* to denote prohibitions; and it was claimed that the existence of this minority (fifteen out of thirty-eight) was inconsistent with the prohibitive character of the perfects accompanied by *neque* (*nec*). But in reply to this claim, I urged that the fifteen instances of verbs denoting mental activity employed in the perfect subjunctive belonged to a period at least a century and a half after Plautus, and that it involves no improbability to assume that the language since Plautus's day had somewhat extended the original tense use in prohibitions. To deny this possibility is to postulate linguistic stagnation.

5. Lastly it was claimed that purpose clauses are at the same time result clauses, and that many clauses hitherto regarded as purpose clauses are really result clauses. The ulterior purpose of this claim was to establish the fact that *neque* (*nec*) is not used by Cicero to introduce the second of two coördinated purpose clauses. Against this contention, it was, I think, made clear that the relations of purpose and result are logically absolutely distinct, and hence that purpose does not involve result. It was also established that no one of Elmer's examples cited in support of the theory just mentioned could be regarded as properly lending itself to his interpretation.

Elmer's general argument against the accepted interpretation of the perfect subjunctive accompanied by *neque* (*nec*) was cumulative in its nature. No single argument could possibly have established his case. Possibly all five might have done so. But if no one of the five is sound, it seems to me that his aggressive assault upon tradition must be held to be futile. This view gains decidedly in weight, I think, in view of the following considerations. There is no probability that the subjunctive of wish (optative)

and the subjunctive of will (volitive, including jussive, prohibitive, hortatory) were so nicely distinguished in the Roman consciousness, as to differ in the use of the negatives associated with them. Both the optative and volitive regularly take *ne* and *neve*. Yet from the earliest period the *optative* does at times take *non* and *neque*. This being so, is it not natural that the volitive also should at times appear accompanied by the same particles? In fact, would it not be passing strange if the volitive should not now and then appear thus accompanied? The conceptions of 'wish' and 'will' were doubtless distinct in Indo-European. They are certainly still distinct in Greek. My own conviction is that, despite the thorough fusion of (Indo-European) subjunctive and optative forms in the Latin, these usages and their many developments can and should be distinguished in that language. Yet the conceptions of 'wish' and 'will', especially in their various extensions and developments, are easily confounded, and, to the ordinary Roman consciousness at least, it seems the most rational thing to believe that optative and volitive usages were not felt as essentially diverse manifestations of modal force. Even many modern students of syntax make no attempt to hold these usages apart in Latin, for example, Dräger, and Schmalz. Under these circumstances, to postulate an absolute and thorough-going divergence in the employment of negatives accompanying optative and volitive usages in Latin would seem to me to be a thesis impossible to maintain. As indubitable instances of the use of *neque* with the optative, I would cite :

Plautus, *Curc.* 27. Nec me ille sirit Juppiter. This is manifestly an optative. Palinurus's words immediately following (Ego item volo) furnish an absolute proof that Phaedromus's *Nec . . . sirit* was a wish, to say nothing of the repeated occurrence of the optative formulas, *ne di sirint* ; *ne Juppiter sirit*, the frequency of which in Plautus makes special citation unnecessary.

id. *Pseud.* 27ff.

Di te deaque ament vel huius arbitrato vel meo :

Vel, si dignu's alio pacto, neque ament nec faciant bene.

Now in 271 *ament* must be optative, and I can see no possible escape from the conclusion that in 272 *neque ament nec faciant* are also optatives. This instance, so far as I can discover, is not once mentioned by Elmer either in his paper in the *American Journal of Philology* or in his exhaustive study of Independent Volitive and Optative expressions published in CORNELL STUDIES, vi. pp. 1-103.

id. Bacchides, 847, *neque Bellona neque Mars creduat*, given by Elmer as optative in CORNELL STUDIES, vi. p. 46.

Cic. *de Off.* ii. 1, 3, *utinam res publica stetisset nec in homines evertendarum rerum cupidos incidisset.*

I add, also, two examples from Horace :

Epod. 10, 7.

Insurgat Aquilo, quantum altis montibus
Frangit trementis ilices,
Nec sidus atra nocte amicum appareat.

Sat. ii. 1, 43.

Juppiter, ut pereat positum robigine telum
Nec quisquam noceat cupido mihi pacis !

An instance of *non* with the optative¹ occurs in Plautus, *Cist.* 555. *Utinam audire non queas.* Elmer (CORNELL STUDIES, vi. p. 70) marks this with a query, but enters upon no discussion. From Cicero, also, we have an instance of *non* in *ad Att.* xi. 9, 3. *Haec ad te die natali meo scripsi, quo utinam susceptus non essem, aut ne quid ex eadem matre postea natum esset !*

Before passing to the positive part of Elmer's paper, in which he advances his theory of 'the subjunctive of obligation and propriety,' we must first pause to consider some objections which he advances against certain subjunctives commonly taken as deliberatives, along with a few usually explained as hortatory.

Elmer protests against regarding as deliberative such expressions as *Cur ego non laeter ? Hunc ego non diligam ?* The deliberative subjunctive is ordinarily explained as a

¹Cf. also Morris *Am. Jour. Phil.* xviii. p. 391.

development of the jussive, *i. e.*, *quid faciam* is thought to have meant originally 'What is your will that I do'; hence 'What do you want me to do?' 'What am I to do?' Expressions of this type Elmer would class as truly deliberative; but in such expressions as *cur non laeter?*—in all clauses, in fact, usually taken as negative deliberatives—he denies the deliberative character and seeks another explanation.

Elmer's objections to regarding these negative expressions as deliberative in character are two:

1. He denies that their meaning suggests any notion of deliberation. This, of course, is perfectly true. But, though true, it by no means constitutes a reason for separating expressions of the type *cur ego non laeter?* from those of the type *quid agam?* It merely shows that the name 'deliberative' is not an accurate designation of the logical content of expressions of this type. Probably all would admit this defect in our nomenclature. To my mind, too, Elmer's criticism of the name 'deliberative' applies equally to affirmative expressions like *quid agam?* I cannot see that in that expression or in similar expressions there is usually any more notion of deliberation than in *cur ego non laeter?* or *hunc hominem non diligam?* As questions both are usually rhetorical. They do not expect an answer. *Quid agam?* *quid faciat?* mean: 'there's nothing I can do,' 'there's nothing he can do,' just as distinctly as *cur ego non laeter?* means 'there's no reason why I shouldn't rejoice,' or *hunc hominem non diligam?* means 'there's no reason why I shouldn't love this man.' So far, then, as dissociating these two subjunctive categories from one another is concerned, I cannot see that any ground is found in a difference of logical meaning. *Quid agam?* is generally admitted to be of volitive origin. At the outset, presumably, it meant 'You want me to do what?' 'What do you direct that I do?' From this it came to be employed in rhetorical questions of indignation, etc. Support for this theory of the volitive origin of the 'deliberative' subjunctive seems to be found also in the frequent formula *quid, vis, faciam?* Cf. also the parallel Greek τί, βούλει, ποιῶμεν; So far as meaning is concerned,

I fail to comprehend why the same origin should not be maintained for *cur ego non laeter? hunc hominem non diligam?* Why should not these at the outset have meant 'Why do you direct that I should not rejoice?' 'Why do you direct that I should not cherish this man?' On the score of meaning, I repeat, I can discover no reason why the theory of a volitive origin should not hold for the negative clauses as well as the affirmative. There is, however, another reason, which must give us pause when the theory of a volitive origin is advocated for these negative expressions, *viz.*, the use of the negative *non*. This brings us to Elmer's second objection.

2. If it be true that the sentence *cur ego non laeter?* was originally equivalent to 'Why do you enjoin me not to rejoice', we should certainly expect the negative *ne*, just as much as if we had the sentence *Cur mihi praecipis ne laeter?* But as a matter of fact the negative in these 'deliberative' subjunctives is *non*.¹ This, urges Elmer, is incompatible with a volitive origin. At first sight this difficulty may seem insurmountable. When we turn to Greek we find that the negative deliberative regularly takes $\mu\eta$ (the volitive negative), so that in that quarter, so far from getting help, we encounter fresh obstacles. My own view, however, has long been that we can account for the presence of *non* in this way: In affirmative deliberative sentences we have

¹ Kühner, *Ausf. Gr.* ii. pp. 136 f., gives one instance of *ne* in a negative 'deliberative' subjunctive. But the case is not genuine. It occurs in Cic. *ad Att.* xii. 40, 2, *ne doleam? ne iaceam?* Both of these are clauses of negative purpose,—'that I may not grieve? That I may not be prostrated?' It is curious that Elmer in alluding to this passage involves himself in a contradiction. On p. 314 he alludes to *ne doleam* as a genuine negative deliberative; yet, on the very following page, he takes Kühner to task for citing it as such. There can be no doubt that Kühner is in error, and that no instance of a negative 'deliberative' sentence containing *ne* can be cited. Cf. Schmalz, *Berl. Phil. Woch.*, 1898, Col. 787. I call attention to this point chiefly because Elmer seems (on p. 314) to imply the existence of such negative expressions, recognizing them as true deliberatives. The same view is, apparently, somewhat widely entertained. Cf., *e. g.*, Lattmann, *de Coniunctivo Latino*, p. 13; and again p. 30.

already noted that every trace of the volitive origin soon disappeared. *Quid agam?* like *τί ποῦν*; was at the outset undoubtedly felt as 'What do you want me to do?' but this form of speech early came to lose entirely its primitive volitive force and to be merely a rhetorical way of making an assertion. Under these circumstances we have only to assume that the negative 'deliberative' with *non* did not develop till the affirmative type had reached the stage where it was felt logically as an emphatic assertion. Then the negative *non* would naturally be employed.¹ It is possible that anterior to the negative 'deliberative' subjunctive with *non*, another type of negative 'deliberative' subjunctive held the field. I refer to negative 'deliberatives' accompanied by *ni*: Plautus, *Mil. Glo.* 554, *Quid ni fateare?* 1120, *Quid ego ni ita censeam?* 1311, *Quid ego ni fleam?* *Pseud.* 96, *Quid ego ni fleam?* 652, *Quid ego ni teneam?* 917, *Quippe ego ni contemnam?* *Stichus*, 333, *Quid ni rogitem?* *Men.* 912, *Quid ni sentiam?* *Curc.* 423, *Quid ni noverim?* Now it is very probable that these expressions were all originally volitive and represent a type displaced later by expressions with *non*¹; *ni* like *ne* is the negative of the volitive, and as such appears in the early Latinity in combination with imperatives and in purpose clauses, etc. Deliberatives of this type would then supply the 'missing link' corresponding to the *μη* clauses of Greek. Yet, even these deliberatives with *ni*, it should be noted, have a purely rhetorical force, quite as much so as those accompanied by *non*.

But, to return from this digression, the explanation above advanced of the use of *non* in negative deliberative subjunctive clauses receives, to my mind, striking confirmation from certain similar phenomena in other clauses of a demonstrably volitive origin. If there be any use of the subjunctive in subordinate

¹ Cf. the *Appendix* to my *Latin Grammar*, p. 196, § 363 b.

¹ Morris, *Am. Jour. Phil.*, xviii, p. 142, also regards these as the negative form of *quid censeam*, *quid fleam*, etc. Cf. *ibid.* p. 392, "*ne* was once the negative of such questions." I must, however, dissent entirely from Morris's explanation of these expressions as potentials.

clauses, which is clearly and unmistakably of volitive origin, it is the use of the subjunctive in the *quamvis*-clause. Thus *quamvis contendas* is explained as originally: 'contend as much as you will,' then, 'much as you contend,' 'though you contend.' Yet in Cicero, *Laelius*, 3, 11, we read, *Senectus quamvis non sit gravis, tamen aufert eam viriditatem*. According to Elmer's general theory of the use of negatives, the presence of the *non* here ought to be regarded as disproving the volitive origin of the *quamvis* clause; only *ne* should satisfy the requirements of the situation. But is it not perfectly natural that, after the *quamvis*-clause (originally volitive) had secondarily developed adversative ("concessive") force, so that its volitive origin was lost sight of, it should then take *non* as its negative? It is impossible in this example successfully to maintain that the *non* spends its force on the *gravis*. Both the sense of the clause and the position of the words forbid this.

Another instance precisely similar is Cic. *Phil.* xii. 3, 8, *ut non referat pedem*, where it is due entirely to the developed force of the adversative *ut*-clause that *non* is employed. For here again the *ut*-clause in its origin was beyond question volitive. Further instances of the same kind are Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* i, 8. 16, *ut enim non efficias quod vis*; *ad Att.* ii, 15, 2, *verum ut hoc non sit, tamen praeclarum spectaculum mihi propono*. Kühner's explanation of *ut non* here in place of *ne* (*Ausf. Gr.* ii. p. 822, Anm. 5) is: "*ut non*, wenn die Negation auf ein einzelnes Wort bezogen ist." But the "single word" in these examples is the *only* word in the clause, and *ne* would have served as well as *ut non* to negative that. The phrase *referat pedem*, too, above cited from Cic. *Phil.* xii, is practically a single word. Cf. Reisig-Haase, *Vorlesungen*, iii, p. 481, N. 495, whose view is that *non* occurs often enough instead of *ne* where it cannot properly be said to belong to a single word.

Again in *Laelius*, 15, 52, we have *Nam quis est (pro deorum fidem atque hominum) qui velit, ut neque diligat quemquam nec ipse ab ullo diligatur, circumfluere omnibus copiis atque in omnium rerum abundantia vivere*. The *ut*-clause here belongs to a type seldom adequately recognized. For want of a better name I

would call it 'Stipulative.' Good illustrations of the type are seen in Plaut. *Bacch.* 874 f.

Vis tibi ducentos nummos iam promittier,

Ut ne clamorem hic facias? 'Will you take two hundred pieces, on the understanding that you are not to make an outcry?' Cic. *de lege agraria* i, 3, 9, etiam illud, quod homines sancti non facient, ut pecuniam accipiant ne vendant, tamen id eis ipsum per legem licebit, 'a thing will be possible by the law which upright men will not do, viz : accept money on the understanding that they are not to sell.' The volitive origin of these and similar clauses is sufficiently clear, and the regular negative accompanying them is *ne*; yet Cicero, in the *Laelius* passage above cited, connects the two verbs in a construction of this kind by *neque . . . nec*. Nor can the subjunctives in this passage be taken as clauses of result. The sense forbids. The passage cannot mean 'revel in all plenty, so as to love no one and be loved by no one'; but Cicero represents Laelius as asking 'who would be so foolish as to wish to revel in luxury on pain of loving no one and being loved by none?' i. e., 'on the understanding that he love no one and be loved by none.'

Exactly the same use occurs in Plautus *Asin.*, 234 f.: sed in leges meas . . . perpetuom annum hunc mihi uti serviat, Nec quemquam interea alium admittat prorsus quam me ad se virum.

Cf. also the late use of *dummodo non* (Juv. vii, 222). In the best period the negative in such clauses is *ne*. This is in conformity with their volitive origin. But as the origin of these proviso clauses grew dim in the folk consciousness, the invasion of *non* became possible.

In view of the undeniable fact, therefore, that *non* has in various types of clauses of volitive origin invaded the field of *ne*; in view, moreover, of the psychological naturalness of such invasion, it seems to me that we have an added reason for believing that the *non* with negative 'deliberative' subjunctives does not conflict with the volitive theory of origin hitherto advocated for these clauses.

Elmer's assault, therefore, upon the negative 'deliberative' subjunctive would seem to have no better justification than that

upon the prohibitives accompanied by *neque*; and as it was the confident rejection of these two categories that constituted the chief basis of Elmer's advocacy of a Subjunctive of Obligation and Propriety, it might seem possible to dismiss further consideration of this topic. It remains, however, to examine certain features of Elmer's positive theory of a subjunctive of this kind, and to show that, even were we to concede in his favor the points already discussed, his positive theory contains serious defects. As explained at the outset, Elmer's explanation of Cic. *Acad.* ii, 46, 141, *nec me minus hominem quam te putaveris*, is: 'nor ought you to think me less a man than yourself.' This force he explains as a development of the subjunctive of contingent futurity, the 'should'-'would' use, commonly called in our grammars potential. Literally, then, the words mean 'nor would you think me less a man than yourself'; and from this meaning Elmer holds that there developed the notion of obligation,—the 'ought' idea. His view is that "the two expressions, 'no one would think' and 'no one should [ought to] think,' do not lie so far apart that one could not readily pass into the other." "In fact," he continues, "it frequently happens that one hesitates whether to use 'would' or 'should' in translating a subjunctive." As an illustration he cites Tac. *Ann.*, iii, 50, *nec quicquam grave ac serium ex eo metuas, qui suorum ipse flagitiorum proditor non virorum animis sed muliercularum adrepat*. This, he maintains, can be translated *ad libitum*: 'one would not apprehend' or 'one should not apprehend anything.' With this statement I should take decided issue. I cannot think that Tacitus here means to do more than state what is a general tendency, not what is an obligation. Certainly what a person would do under general circumstances (as in the Tacitus passage) or under special circumstances, bears no necessary or natural relation to what he ought to do. Sometimes one would do what one ought. Oftener, I fear, one would do what one ought not. Nor can I regard as happier Elmer's attempt further to illustrate this alleged closeness of connection between the 'would' and 'ought' ideas. He asserts: "That the two ideas are practically equivalent for certain purposes is shown by the fact that they are sometimes expressed by the same word in our own language." The fallacy

in these words is a subtle one. It is perfectly true that one and the same word (*should*) is, in the first person, used in English to express the 'would' and the 'ought' ideas. We say: 'We should (ought to) obey these laws'; we also say, 'We should obey these laws, if they should be enacted.' But does this support in the least Elmer's claim that the two ideas are practically equivalent? Two ideas expressed by the same word *employed in the same sense* might be expected to be equivalent, but, when two ideas are expressed by the same word *used in radically different senses*, one of which is an historical development of the other, have we any right to maintain that the ideas are practically equivalent or in the least similar? It is not a question of words; it is a question of ideas.

Elmer's next argument in favor of the development of the 'ought' idea from the 'would' idea is drawn from the Greek. He cites the occurrence in that language of such expressions as οὐκ ἄν ἀγορεύουσ Hom. *Il. B.* 250, which he translates 'you should not talk' originally, of course, 'you would not talk'. But, so far as I can find, Elmer is alone in his interpretation of this passage. Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, § 237, to whom Elmer refers, says that probably it has "the force of a mild command."

Lastly, proof of the practical equivalence of the 'would' and 'ought' ideas is sought in the fact that in Greek the place of a potential optative with ἄν in the conclusion of a conditional sentence is sometimes taken by χρή or δέῃ with the infinitive. This is perfectly true, *e. g.*, Soph. *Ant.* 666, ὃν πόλις στήσῃς, τοῦδε χρή κλίνειν, 'we ought to obey any one the state appoints.' But can any one for a moment maintain the logical identity of 'we ought to obey' and 'we should (would) obey?' The apodosis corresponding to a condition expressed by εἰ with the optative ordinarily falls into a definite logical groove (the 'would' idea); yet not always. There is a certain freedom in the logical form of the apodosis. That is all that is proved by such examples as the Sophocles passage above cited.

The foregoing are Elmer's positive arguments in favor of the development of the 'ought' idea from the 'would' idea. It has

been shown, I think, that not one of them furnishes the slightest support for his theory, just as it was previously shown that no new theory was necessary.

It may be well, however, to examine a few applications of the theory to concrete cases. To my mind, it fails totally to meet the requirements of the sense in nearly every passage to which its author would apply it, *e.g.*, Plaut. *Trin.* 627, *Sta ilico: noli avorsari neque te occultassis mihi.* By Elmer's theory this means, 'Stop where you are; don't turn away, and you ought n't to hide.' Can any one feel satisfied with this interpretation? Enn. *Ann.* 143 (Baehr.), *Nec mi aurum posco nec mi pretium dederitis,* 'I neither demand gold nor ought you to give me a reward'; *ibid.* 509, *Nemo me dacrumis decoret neque funera fletu faxit,* 'No one ought to honor me with tears nor celebrate my obsequies with weeping'; Ter. *And.* 392, *Nec tu ea causa minueris haec quae facis,* 'Nor ought you to stop doing what you are now about'; Plaut. *Capt.* 149, *Aha, Hegio, numquam istuc dixis neque animum induxis tuom,* 'Ah, Hegio, you ought not to say that, nor ought you to persuade yourself.' It should be noted that the speaker (Ergasilus) is laboring under great excitement; his previous utterances in this scene betray the profoundest emotion. Nothing less than the prohibitive, therefore, satisfies the demands of the sense. *Cf.*, the similar passage, *Trin.* 704: *Id me commissurum ut patiar fieri ne animum induxeris,* and, for *dixis*, *Mil. Glo.* 862, *Ne dixeritis, obsecro.*

So far from satisfying the sense, therefore, I cannot but feel that the interpretations suggested by Elmer in these and similar passages do great violence to the thought.

Elmer's final illustration of the application of his theory is of special nature, and he lays such stress upon its significance that we cannot waive its examination. The passage is Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* i. 41, 48, *Ne vos quidem, iudices, mortem timueritis.* The special objections which he urges against taking this as a prohibitive may, I think, in the light of our previous discussion, properly be disregarded. I turn to his positive argument in favor of taking the clause as one of 'obligation or propriety.' Elmer notes that the passage in which the sentence under discussion occurs is a close translation of chapters 32 and 33 of Plato's *Apology*. He

observes: "The part of which the particular sentence concerned is a translation, runs as follows: 'Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρεή, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον. The perfect subjunctive is, then, here equivalent to *χρή* with the infinitive.'" "This," he adds, ". . . seems to me to prove beyond all possible doubt that *non timueritis* may, without the least hesitation, be translated by 'you should not fear.' *nec putaveris* by 'nor should you think,' etc., etc., wherever 'should' seems to make a better translation than 'would.'" But have we any right to base such sweeping conclusions upon any single translation? Moreover, what does Cicero himself tell us of his method of translating from Greek into Latin? In a memorable passage in the *De optimo genere oratorum* 5, 13 f., speaking of the usefulness of such translation, he tells us, with the instinct of the true artist, that in preparing Latin versions of Demosthenes *On the Crown* and Aeschines *Against Ctesiphon*, he did not render word for word, but that his aim was to preserve the style and spirit of these two *orationes nobilissimae*, "weighing their words", he adds, "not counting them." Is it not reasonable to believe that he was actuated by the same instinct in his paraphrase of the *Apology* passage in the *Tusc. Disp.*? If it is, then we can hardly make the translation a basis for syntactical revolution.

The foregoing discussion has been based entirely upon Elmer's theory of a 'Subjunctive of Obligation and Propriety' as set forth in his original article in *The American Journal of Philology*, vol. xv. In his *Studies in Latin Moods and Tenses* (CORNELL STUDIES, vol. vi), Elmer renews the discussion of this theory. No fresh argument in its favor is advanced, so far as I can see, but the scope of its application is considerably widened. Elmer now includes two fresh categories of subjunctive expressions under this head, viz.:

1. Expressions of the type: *Maue*; *hoc quod coepi primum enarrem* (Ter. *Haut.*, 273);

Tantas turbellas facio, sed crepuit foris:

Ecfertur praeda ex Troia. Taceam nunciam (Plaut. *Bacch.*, 1058).

2. Expressions of the type: *restitisses*, *repugnasses*, 'you ought to have resisted', 'you ought to have opposed' (Cic. *pro Sestio*, 20, 45).

Both of these types of the subjunctive are confessedly difficult of explanation. Those of the first type are considerably rarer than those of the second. Ordinarily they are taken as 'Subjunctives of Determined Resolution', *i. e.*, as a phase of the volitive subjunctive. See, for example, Delbrück, *Vergleichende Syntax*, in Brugmann und Delbrück, *Grundriss der Vergleichenden Grammatik*, iv. 2, § 125, p. 384. Kühner, *Ausf. Gram.*, ii. p. 136, § 47, 1, *a*; Riemann, *Syntaxe Latine*², p. 260. I have followed these scholars in my own treatment of such expressions in my *Appendix*, p. 194, § 358. *b*. This view receives support from the testimony both of Greek and of Sanskrit, as pointed out by Delbrück in his *Conjunctiv und Optativ im Sanskrit und Griechischen*, (*Syntaktische Forschungen*, i.) p. 19, *e. g.*, brahmacâry âsâni, 'I'm resolved to be a disciple of Brahma.' Cf. in Greek, Homer, *Odys.*, v 296, ἀλλ' ἄγε οἱ καὶ ἐγὼ δῶ ξείνῳ, 'I'm bound to give him a guest-present.' Accordingly the Terence passage above cited has ordinarily been explained as 'I'm determined to finish telling'; and similarly the passage from Plautus's *Bacchides* as 'I'm determined to keep quiet now.' I have to confess that in some expressions of this type this interpretation seems occasionally a slight forcing of the sense, and I would therefore offer the suggestion that in such instances we may regard the first singular as used after the analogy of the first plural (hortatory) and as intended to give (by a kind of dramatic doubling of the speaker's identity) the exhortation of an individual to himself. This interpretation seems to me to fit the *Bacchides* passage better than the other, — *viz.*, 'let me keep still', not, of course, in the sense of 'permit', but in the same sense as the hortatory plural 'let us keep still.' So in the passage from the *Odyssey* above cited, I should prefer to explain the ἄγε, δῶ, as 'come. let me give him', etc. This explanation, of course, implies a volitive origin, just as distinctly as the other.

In expressions of the second type, *restitisses*, *repugnasses*, etc., there can be no dispute as to the meaning. So far as I am

aware, all scholars agree in interpreting them as meaning, 'You ought to have resisted,' 'you ought to have opposed.' The only question concerns their origin. Usually they have been explained as developments of the volitive subjunctive. Elmer, in bringing them under his 'Subjunctive of Obligation and Propriety,' necessarily refers them to the 'would' subjunctive,—lit., 'you would have resisted,' and 'so you ought to have resisted.' But to do this is not merely to assume a questionable development of meaning (as already pointed out above), but is also to ignore the testimony presented by the employment of negatives in expressions of this type. The negative is regularly *ne* not *non*. The material is not especially abundant, and I give it in full:

Plautus¹, *Men.* 611, At tu ne clam me comesses prandium; *Pseud.* 437, tu ne faceres; Cic. in *Verrem*, ii. 3, 84, 195, ne emisses; *id. ad Att.* ii. 1, 3, ne poposcisses. One passage with *non* will be mentioned later. This use of *ne* certainly demands a candid attempt to explain these clauses as of volitive origin; nor is this difficult. I venture to repeat from my *Appendix* (p. 195, § 362), my own explanation of them: "Corresponding to the jussive *loquatur*, 'let him speak,' 'he's to speak,' there developed an imperfect use, *loqueretur*, 'he was to speak,' 'he should have spoken.' This use is manifestly a derived one, since one cannot now will a person to have done in the past what he obviously has failed to do. An expression like *loqueretur*, therefore, must have been formed after the analogy of *loquatur*. The pluperfect subjunctive also occurs in this sense [evidently an attempt to bring out more distinctly the reference to the past], as *eum imitatus esses*, 'you ought to have imitated him.' The volitive character of these expressions is shown by the fact that the negative is regularly *ne*."² I ought there to have added that both

¹ Schmalz, therefore, is in error when he declares (Reisig-Haase, *Vorlesungen*, iii. p. 373) that Cicero's use of *ne* in *ne poposcisses* is at variance with Plautus's usage in expressions of this type. On *Trin.* 133, *non redderes*, see below.

² Cf. Dräger, *Hist. Synt.*², i. p. 310: "Die Form der Negation (*ne*) zeugt allerdings für die jussive Bedeutung des Modus."

tenses (the imperfect and pluperfect) occur in negative expressions of this type, just as in affirmative expressions.

Elmer, now, ignores the two Plautus passages altogether and contents himself with the observation that the text of the two Cicero passages is "quite possibly corrupt," or that, if it be sound, the two expressions are mere curiosities. As regards the trustworthiness of our MS. tradition in these passages, it is difficult to see what portions of any ancient writer are not "quite possibly corrupt," if that is true of the two passages under discussion. In one of them the MSS. are unanimous; in the other, several MSS. read the senseless *at ni*, instead of *aut ne*. On this second passage C. F. W. Müller, in his *adnotatio critica*, does not even deem it worth while to allude to the existence of any variant. Such attitude as Elmer's toward our MSS. is well nigh inconceivable in one who protests so vehemently as he against tampering with the text handed down to us. Cf. his remarks, *Studies in Latin Moods and Tenses*, p. 173, note. Moreover we find this same use of *ne* with the subjunctive in the archaist Fronto (a man saturated with his Plautus and a confessed imitator), p. 114, 17, (Naber). *Socrates ne coargueret, Zeno ne disceptaret, Diogenes ne increparet, nequid Pythagora sanciret, nequid Heraclitus absconderet, nequid Clitomachus ambigeret* (Cf. Priebe, de Frontone imitationem prisci sermonis lat. adfectante (Stettin, 1886), p. 3f.); also in Seneca, *ad Polyb. Cons.* 6, 3, *ne couvertisses in te ora omnium*. In a single instance, it is true, we do have the negative *non* in an expression of this type. The passage is, Plaut. *Trin.* 133, *non redderes*, 'you ought not to have given back', where, according to the strict canon, we should have expected *ne redderes*. But here *non* is easily explained as resulting from the previous question. The whole verse is: *Non ego illi argentum redderem? CA. Non redderes*. Evidently the answer here intentionally repeats, as nearly as possible, the exact diction of the original inquiry.

It seems to me, therefore, that we must regard Elmer's objections to the current explanation of these last two types of subjunctives as equally unsound with those directed against the pro-

hibitive and the deliberative. In point of meaning, to be sure, the 'ought' idea fits perfectly the imperfects and pluperfects we have just been considering, but it fails utterly to satisfy the requirement of the sense in those passages which I explained as subjunctives of 'determined resolution.' I consequently feel that the 'Subjunctive of Obligation and Propriety' in the sense advocated by Elmer is devoid of the slightest claim to recognition in explanation of the syntactical phenomena of the Latin subjunctive.

In conclusion I desire simply to offer an explanation of the processes by which we may conceive *neque* (*nec*) to have invaded the domain of *neve* (*neu*). For some reason the correlative use of *neve* (*neu*) *neve* (*neu*) with verbs never developed in Latin. This may seem a bold statement, but I am confident that it is correct. In the early laws, as shown by inscriptions, we do, it is true, find repeated instances of the repetition of *neve*, in successive imperatives. See, for instance, the Lex Julia Municipalis. But these *neve*'s are not used correlatively in the sense of 'neither on the one hand nor on the other.' In the laws every *neve* is simply 'and . . . (shall) not, and . . . (shall) not,' etc. When it is desirable to express the sharply antithetical 'neither on the one hand nor on the other' in connection with volitive subjunctives (jussive, prohibitive, hortatory), *neque* (*nec*) *neque* (*nec*) is really the only instrument available, as seen in such examples as Plautus, *Menaechmi*, 221, *Neque defiat neque supersit*, 'on the one hand let there not be a lack, nor on the other, too much.' I should also so take Plaut. *Asin.* 854, *Neque divini neque mi humani posthac quicquam accreduas*. Then again suppose a Latin writer wished to say 'on the one hand I will not conceal anything from you, and on the other, don't you conceal anything from me.' He can hardly say *neque ego te celabo neve tu me celassis*; the first *neque* inevitably leads to a second *neque*, even with the prohibitive, and so Plautus says, *Stichus*, 149, *neque ego te celabo neque tu me celassis*. Cf. *Rudens*, 1027, *Neque tu me quoquam indicassis neque ego tibi quicquam dabo*. *Bacchides*, 476, *ipsus neque amat nec tu creduas*.

I may cite one other type of clause that might have led to the

invasion of the *neve* field by *neque* (*nec*). Let us suppose a writer wished to say 'on the one hand let us not measure virtue by high sounding words, and on the other let us count as good those men who are so considered.' Shall he say *neve virtutem metiamur virosque numeremus*? If not, what remains except to say *neque metiamur virosque numeremus*? That is what Cicero says in *Laelius*, 6, 21.

I have simply cited a few illustrations of natural processes by which *neque* (*nec*) might come into use in prohibitive expressions. Once established, in clauses of whatever type, its extension would be almost a matter of certainty. If we examine these sentences in accordance with an ideally perfect scheme for the employment of negatives, they undoubtedly offend, but we must remember that language is very imperfect, and very elastic. Grammarians lay down principles and formulate precise rules of usage, but nearly every rule is violated more or less frequently. Outside of a few elementary principles, I have long ceased to believe that there is any 'always' in syntax. A perfect scheme of language may be conceived by the philosopher, but the world can never expect to see such a scheme in practice. Analogy, the striving for symmetry, the blundering association of ideas, are all sure to lead to endless innovation and must ever effectively prevent the realization of the logician's dream.

CHAPTER II.

ARE WE TO RECOGNIZE A 'MAY' POTENTIAL IN LATIN?

In his *Studies in Latin Moods and Tenses* (CORNELL STUDIES IN CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY, vi), pp. 176-197, Elmer discusses the question which stands at the head of this chapter. His examination of the question, however, is incomplete. Subjunctives hitherto regarded as 'may' potentials have been *fuat* in the phrases *fors fuat an*, *fors fuat ut*, 'it may be a chance whether', 'there may be a chance that'; *sit* in *forsitan*, 'perhaps' (originally *fors sit an*, 'it may be a chance whether'); expressions like Plautus, *Asin.* 465, *sit, non sit*, 'maybe he is, maybe he isn't'; Pliny, *Epp.* i. 23, 2, *erraverim, fortasse*, 'I may have erred, perhaps'; Fronto, p. 25, 10; 136, 1; 224, 19 (Naber), *quaeras fortasse*, 'perhaps you may ask'; *ibid.* p. 63, 1, *tu fortasse requiras*; *ibid.* p. 159, *dicas fortasse*; *ibid.* p. 114, 9, *sed haec exempla fortasse contemnas*. Ps-Quint. *Decl. ccli* (p. 27, 28, Ritter), *habeant fortasse*, 'perhaps they may have'; also expressions of the type *aliquis* (*quispiam*) *dixerit*, *aliquis dicat*, 'some one may say.' Elmer's discussion is restricted to a consideration of the last two categories, *aliquis dixerit* and *aliquis dicat*. The other subjunctives commonly claimed as illustrating the 'may' potential are entirely ignored. Inasmuch as any adequate discussion of the modal use of *dixerit* in *aliquis dixerit* depends upon the probable character of *dicat* in *aliquis dicat*, and inasmuch as the modal use of *dicat* in this phrase is illuminated by a discussion of the group of isolated expressions above enumerated, it seems best to discuss these last at the outset, reserving till later a consideration of *aliquis dixerit*.

To my mind the subjunctive in every one of the isolated expressions above enumerated ought to be regarded as a 'may' potential. *Fuat* in the expression *fors fuat an* naturally means 'it may be'; to translate this phrase: 'it would be a chance whether', seems to me to do violence to the sense. The auxiliary

'would' implies that the event predicated is only contingently true, *i. e.*, that it would occur only under certain more or less definite conditions, either expressed or implied. I cannot feel that any such contingency is implied in the phrase *fors fuat an*; to me, *fuat* denotes merely an objective possibility. This phrase, to be sure, is not frequent, yet it appears in Plautus, *e. g.*, *Pseud.* 432, and again in Fronto, p. 143, 14; Symmachus, *Ep.* i. 39; 4, 28; 29; while *fors fuat ut* is found in Symmachus, *Ep.* 2, 7. Similarly the phrase *forsitan* seems to me to imply the existence of a 'may' potential *sit* in the early language; for *forsitan* can hardly be anything but *fors sit an*, 'it may be a chance whether.' This same use of *sit* as a 'may' potential seems to occur also in Plautus, *Asinaria*, 463 f.:

ME. Credam fore, dum quidem ipse in manu habebō.

Peregrinus ego sum : Sauream non novi. LI. At nosce sane.

ME. Sit, non sit; non edepol scio.

No other possible interpretation suggests itself to me here except 'it may be he, it may not be he; I don't pretend to know.'

Horace, *Carmina*, i. 28, 33, is regarded by Elmer (*Studies*, p. 196, footnote 2) as textually so uncertain that no argument can be based upon it in support of a 'may' potential. The passage runs as follows:

Neglegis inmeritis nocituram

Postmodo te natis fraudem committere? Fors et

Debita iura vicesque superbae

Te maneat ipsum.

Elmer thinks the reading *fors et* open to question, and adds: "The correct reading may well be *forsan*. *Forsan* is the reading of the oldest MS. of Horace (B) and is supported by several other good MSS." That *forsan* is here the correct reading, is, I am convinced, impossible. If Horace had written *forsan*, the passage would have been perfectly simple, and the rise of the variant *fors et* in our MSS. would be inconceivable. But assuming that he wrote *fors et*, the reading *forsan* of B is easily accounted for as originally a gloss that has supplanted *fors et*. The scholiasts of Horace evidently read *fors et*, and it is

noteworthy that they explain *fors et* by *forsan*. In my judgment there ought to be no doubt as to the soundness of the text in this passage, and, if the text is sound, the subjunctive *maneant* is obviously a 'may' potential. *Fors et* is used in the sense of *fors etiam*, *fortasse etiam*. Other instances of this use are Verg., *Aen.* xi. 49; Propertius, ii. 9, 1; Statius, *Silvae* 3, 4. *Fors etiam* is found in Valerius Flaccus, iv. 620. Elmer urges that in none of these instances do we have a present subjunctive. But I cannot see that that circumstance ought to cause us the least hesitation in recognizing a 'may' potential in the Horace passage.

Another phrase of obviously 'may' potential character is *quaeras fortasse*, which appears repeatedly in Fronto, *e. g.*, p. 25, l. 10 (Naber); p. 136, l. 1; p. 224, l. 19. No less clearly 'may' potential in sense are *fortasse requiras*, Fronto, p. 63, 1; *dicas fortasse*, *ibid.* p. 159, 19; *fortasse contemnas*, *ibid.* p. 114, 9; *habeant fortasse*, Ps- Quint. *Decl. ccli.* (p. 27, l. 28, Ritter); *erraverim fortasse*, Pliny, *Ep.* i. 23, 2. In this last we have the perfect used in reference to past time.

The foregoing are merely a few illustrations, most of which were gathered incidentally in the course of reading. Other instances quite as decisive, could, I am sure, be gathered in abundance by systematic searching, particularly in the Latinity of the Early Empire. However, I think enough has been cited to warrant a faith in the existence of the 'may' potential. As regards the significance of the examples cited from post-Augustan writers, I trust no one will wish to wave these rudely aside as symptoms of "the decline." It is, of course, perfectly true that the evidence of a post-Augustan prose writer or an Augustan poet cannot be cited in support of the diction of the Ciceronian age, and those scholars whose conception of standard Latin is limited to Ciceronian Latin are, therefore, perfectly justified in their attitude when they reject the diction of poets and of post-Augustan prose-writers as of no weight in determining standard usage. But the problem we are discussing is of another kind. We are not inquiring what is good Latin. We are engaged with questions of interpretation. We are seeking to determine a fundamental meaning of a Latin

mood ; and in such a problem I feel that the testimony drawn from Pliny, Ps- Quintilian, Fronto, and other writers of the Silver Age is of the greatest significance. For it is not likely that a new fundamental meaning of a mood or case would be developed in a language at this stage. The innovations are rather extensions of resources already existent. Hence when we find the 'may' potential in the first and second centuries A.D., it would seem to afford strong confirmation of the existence of this idiom much earlier, even were it not for the evidence belonging to the earlier period which I have cited.

I turn next to a consideration of the modal character of the subjunctive in expressions of the type: *aliquis dicat*. As is well known, the instances of this idiom are extremely few. Eight occurrences only are given by Roby in his *Latin Grammar*, ii. p. ci. Of these, two are in Terence, one in Horace, two in Livy, one in Ovid, one in Persius, one in the elder Pliny. Elmer naturally examines first the two passages from Terence:

And. 640, Sed quid agam? adeamne ad eum et cum eo iniuriam hanc expostulem?

Ingeram mala multa? atque aliquis dicat 'nil promoveris':
Multum: molestus certe ei fuero, etc.

Eun. 511, Roget quis 'quid rei tibi cum illa?' Ne noram quidem.

In the *Andria* passage, *aliquis dicat* has ordinarily been taken as an instance of the 'may' potential, 'some one may say'; similarly *roget quis* in the passage from the *Eunuchus* has been interpreted as meaning 'some one may ask.' Elmer's view is that this interpretation is incorrect, and that both of these subjunctives are to be regarded as jussive subjunctives with the force of protases, *i. e.*, 'let some one say' (= 'if some one should say'), 'let some one ask' (= 'if some one should ask'). He compares Cic. *De nat. deor.* i. 21, 57, Roges me, qualem naturam deorum esse ducam, nihil fortasse respondeam, *i. e.*, 'should you ask me, I should perhaps reply.' In further support of this explanation he cites the testimony of the Latin commentators on Terence, *viz.*: Donatus and Eugraphius. Elmer thinks it "clear that both Do-

natus and Eugegraphius understood *aliquis dicat* and *roget quis* in these passages as instances of the volitive [jussive] use of the subjunctive." "The comment of Donatus on *atque aliquis dicat* in the first passage is: Hoc dicit: Et si existat aliquis, qui mihi dicat, 'Quid profeceris?' respondebo 'multum'; and that of Eugegraphius is: Itaque quasi aliquis dicat frustra accusaturum esse Pamphilum: Si quis ergo est qui dicat, 'nihil promoveris': tamquam responsio subiungitur verbum illud quod sequitur, 'Multum', hoc est 'multum promovero.' On the *roget quis*, in the second passage, Donatus has no comment, but Eugegraphius says it is equivalent to si quis interroget, quid mihi cum meretrice sit, respondebo: ne noram quidem. It is clear, then, that Donatus and Eugegraphius felt nothing like a potential idea in either one of these passages. Such an interpretation seems to be an invention of modern grammarians."

But is the opinion of Donatus on one passage or the joint opinion of Donatus and Eugegraphius on another passage, entitled to the weight which Elmer seems to attach to the utterances of these commentators? What evidence is there that either of them was competent to pass sober judgment upon such a point? If we assume that they were either or both competent and well qualified judges of the matter in controversy, what shall we say of Priscian? His authority ought to carry at least as much weight as that of Donatus or Eugegraphius. Yet he gives us the most fantastic interpretations of the modal force of various Latin subjunctives. Thus (Keil iii. p. 252) he declares that Horace's *scripserit* in *Carm.* i. 6, 14:

Quis Martem tunica tectum adamantina
Digne scripserit?

is for *scribere potuerit*,—a 'could' potential! Similarly (*ibid.* p. 254) we are told that *tulerint* and *hauserit* in Virg. *Aen.* ii. 600, *Iam flammae tulerint inimicus et hauserit ensis*, are equal to *poterant tulisse*, *poterant hausisse*; *ibid.* p. 257, 1, *imitatus esses* in Cic. *in Verr.* ii. 1, 42, 107, *imitatus esses illum ipsum C. Voconium*, is explained as equivalent to *imitari potuisses*. Were we to make the utterances of the ancient commentators and grammarians a basis of interpretation, I fancy it would easily be possible to find in them

support for almost any grotesque theory of linguistic values. The grammarians and commentators, however, cannot be expected to furnish us competent testimony in such matters. They were, to be sure, familiar with Latin as a spoken idiom, but they were manifestly men of deficient linguistic training and unmethodical habits of thought. One cannot, in my judgment, use them with too much caution, especially where they venture to pronounce opinions upon such delicate questions as the one in controversy. But even admitting as true the testimony of Donatus and Eugraphius on the two passages of Terence, I fail to see that their comments justify at all Elmer's conclusions as to the force of *aliquis dicat* and *roget quis*. Donatus and Eugraphius do, to be sure, express the opinion that *aliquis dicat* and *roget quis* have the force of protases. Elmer appears to hold that to have this force they must be jussives. But why cannot a 'may' potential have the force of a protasis? No objection can well be offered to this. The other 'may' potentials already noted often have this force, *e. g.*, Fronto, p. 25, 10, (Naber): *Quaeras fortasse cur tarde*, etc. *Sed . . . dicam quid cum animo meo reputem*, 'if you ask (lit. 'you may perhaps ask') . . . I will tell you what I am thinking'; *ibid.* p. 224, 19, *Quid hoc verbi sit, quaeras fortasse: accipe igitur*, 'if perhaps you want to know what this means, then listen.' The 'may' potential force is also perfectly suited to the remaining six instances of *aliquis dicat* and similar expressions. I give the material in full:

Hor. *Sat.*, i. 3, 19, *noctis vigilabat ad ipsum*

Mane, diem totum stertebat; nil fuit umquam

Sic impar sibi. Nunc aliquis dicat mihi 'quid! tu

Nullane habes vitia?' immo alia et fortasse minora.

Livy, ix. 4, 12, *Sed hic patriam video, hic quicquid Romanarum legionum est. Quae nisi pro se ipsis ad mortem ruere volunt, quid habent, quod morte sua servant? Tecta urbis, dicat aliquis, et moenia et eam turbam, a qua urbs incolitur. Immo hercule produntur ea omnia deleta hoc exercitu, non servantur.*

id. xxxvii. 53, 'Quid ergo postulas?' dicat aliquis. Ego, patres conscripti, quoniam dicere utique volentibus vobis parendum est, . . . nullos accolas nec finitimos habere quam vos malo.

. . . Sed si vobis decedere inde atque deducere exercitus in animo est, neminem digniorem esse ex sociis vestris, qui bello a vobis parta possideat, quam me dicere ausim.

Ov. *Remed. amor.*, 225,

Dura aliquis praecepta vocet mea. Dura fatemur

Esse. Sed ut valeas, multa dolenda feres.

Persius, 3, 88,

Hic aliquis de gente hircosa centurionum

Dicat 'Quod satis est sapio mihi. Non ego curo

Esse quod Arcesilas aerumnosique Solones

His populus ridet, multumque torosa iuventus

Ingeminat tremulos naso crispante cachinnos.

Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xxxvi. 2, Marmora invehi, et maria huius rei causa transiri, quae vetaret, lex nulla lata est. Dicat fortassis aliquis: non enim invehebantur. Id quidem falso. Trecentas novem columnas M. Scauri aedilitate ad scaenam theatri temporarii et vix uno mense futuri in usu, viderunt portari silentio legum.

In the first five of these, Elmer takes the subjunctive as a jussive protasis,—'let some one say', *i. e.*, 'suppose some one says.' I venture to say that this interpretation will seem a forcing of the sense to most persons who will examine the passages under discussion. In the Pliny passage, Elmer does not insist upon applying the interpretation suggested for the five passages just mentioned, but thinks that here it is better to regard the *dicat* as a 'would' subjunctive. His rendering is: "To this remark some one would perhaps rejoin, '(Naturally enough) for they were not imported (in those days).' (If any one should say this, my reply would be), that is where you are wrong'", etc. I must submit that this use of 'would' is unknown to our English speech, and that the word as here used by Elmer is simply an ill disguised 'may.'

In my judgment, therefore, it is logically extremely unnatural, if not impossible, to interpret these eight instances as Elmer proposes. The 'may' potential force alone seems to me to suit the sense, and the existence of the other similar 'may' potentials

already considered affords ample warrant for ranking *aliquis dicat* in the same category.

We come lastly to expressions of the type: *aliquis dixerit*. Like *aliquis dicat*, this type of expression is infrequent. Down to the time of Ulpian only twenty instances are noted. By Elmer these are divided into two classes, according as they are accompanied or not by *fortasse*. There are thirteen instances with *fortasse*; seven without. Elmer's argument is that the mood is the same in these two classes. Accordingly he proceeds to show that *fortasse* is extremely frequent in Cicero with the indicative, especially the future and present; one instance of the future perfect also is found, *ad Att.*, ix. 15, 3, *ego illum fortasse convenero*. On the other hand, *fortasse* does not occur frequently in Cicero with any use of the subjunctive. Hence Elmer concludes (1), that in expressions of the type *aliquis fortasse dixerit*, *dixerit* must be in the future perfect indicative, and (2), that in expressions of the same sort where *fortasse* is absent, the mood must also be the indicative. Additional evidence of the correctness of this conclusion is sought by Elmer in the fact that in the future indicative we frequently find the phrase *aliquis (quispiam) dicet*, whereas the phrase *aliquis dicat* is at best rare, and its use as a 'may' potential is moreover denied by him. He accordingly concludes: "to offset all this evidence for the indicative, there is, so far as I can see, not the slightest evidence of any character whatever, that *dixerit*, in the expression *aliquis dixerit*, is in the subjunctive mood." As Elmer frankly states, this view of *aliquis dixerit* is not new. Most of Elmer's objections to regarding *dixerit* in this phrase as a subjunctive were advanced by Roby nearly thirty years ago in his *Latin Grammar*, ii. p. ci ff. Elmer's contribution to the discussion consists in showing the frequency of *fortasse* with the indicative and the rarity of its use with the subjunctive. But in denying the use of *fortasse* with the 'may' potential for Cicero, Elmer is reasoning in a circle; the only subjunctives with *fortasse* claimed as 'may' potentials for Cicero are the very expressions under discussion, *aliquis fortasse dixerit*, etc. It is perfectly true that, outside of the

expression *aliquis fortasse dixerit*, there is no use of *fortasse* with the 'may' potential in Cicero. But that does not disprove the 'may' potential character of *dixerit* in this phrase. That is the very point in controversy. To determine this point we must obviously look outside of Cicero for data. What do we find? I have already cited at the outset of this chapter several instances of undoubted 'may' potentials from authors other than Cicero; and, of these, several are accompanied by *fortasse* or its equivalents,—in fact most of them are so accompanied. Cf. the Plautine *fors fuat an; forsitan*; Horace's *fors et* (= *fortasse etiam*) *maneant*; Pliny's *erraverim fortasse*; Ps-Quintilian's *habeant fortasse*; Fronto's repeated *quaeras fortasse* (presumably an archaic reminiscence). In one example of *aliquis dicat*, also, (Pliny, *N. H.*, xxxvi. 2) we find *fortassis*. The situation, then, is this: We have a goodly number of undubitable 'may' potentials, most of them accompanied by *fortasse* or an equivalent; we have also eight instances of *aliquis dicat*, one of them accompanied by *fortassis*. On the other hand we note that *fortasse* in general is much less frequent with the subjunctive than with the indicative. The question is: What, under these circumstances, are we to do with the expression *aliquis fortasse dixerit*? Obviously we are at perfect liberty to take it either as a subjunctive or an indicative. The sense alone must determine. Elmer, following Roby, would find it in the future perfect indicative. He accordingly interprets Cicero *De senectute*, 3, 8, *Sed fortasse dixerit quispiam tibi propter opes et copias et dignitatem tuam tolerabiliorem senectutem videri*, as follows: "But in the process of this discourse some one will have said", etc. I cannot help feeling that this is highly absurd. The words quoted are those of Cato. He is speaking to Laelius and Scipio. Obviously, if any one had said anything while Cato was discoursing, it must have been one of these two young men. But *quispiam* cannot refer to either of them. Again, what point is there in the conception, 'will have said during this discourse'? How could any one have said anything during the discourse without interrupting the speaker? It cannot be urged that *dixerit* means 'will have said to himself'; that would have been *secum dixerit*. In short, a *tu fortasse putaveris* or something similar might be conceived of as a future per-

fect indicative in the sense demanded by Elmer, but a *fortasse dixerit quispiam* in this sense is to me inconceivable. Let us take another passage: Cic. *De orat.* ii. 24, 99, *riserit aliquis fortasse hoc praeceptum*. To be understood, this passage must be given with the full context: Verum ut aliquando ad causas deducamus illum, quem instituimus, et eas quidem, in quibus plusculum negoti est, iudiciorum atque litium—*riserit aliquis fortasse hoc praeceptum*; est enim non tam acutum quam necessarium magisque monitoris non fatui quam eruditi magistri—hoc ei primum praecipiemus, quascumque causas erit tractaturus, ut eas diligenter penitusque cognoscat. Now, if *riserit aliquis fortasse hoc praeceptum* means 'some one perhaps in the course of this discourse will have laughed at this precept', we get the anomaly of some one laughing at a precept before it is enunciated. Or, take another case: *Tusc. Disp.* v. 4, 10, de disciplina aliud tempus fuerit fortasse dicendi. Can this seriously be taken to mean 'as to discipline, there will perhaps [during this discourse?] have been another opportunity of speaking'? I forbear to weary the reader by examining in detail the other instances of expressions of this type. A candid scrutiny will, I am confident, persuade most persons that the future perfect indicative fails completely in every instance to satisfy the demands of the sense. This being so, our only alternative is to take *dixerit*, etc., in expressions of this type as a 'may' potential, an interpretation supported not merely by the assured 'may' potential character of the closely analogous phrase *aliquis dicat*, but also by that of other subjunctives both with and without *fortasse*. If *aliquis fortasse dixerit* be taken as illustrating the 'may' potential, there certainly can be no hesitation in so regarding *aliquis dixerit* without *fortasse*. Elmer has expressed the conviction that the two categories are identical in modal character, and no one, I think, can show ground for dissent from this attitude.

The Latin 'may' potential, therefore, ought hardly yet to be relegated to the limbo of exploded heresies. The usage certainly is not frequent. It is confined within narrow and, for the most part, stereotyped limits. Yet within these limits, the usage would seem to be as well entitled to recognition as that of any other type of the subjunctive.

CHAPTER III.

SHOULD WE RECOGNIZE A 'CAN'-'COULD' POTENTIAL?

In his *Studies in Latin Moods and Tenses* (CORNELL STUDIES IN CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY, vi.), pp. 198 ff., 207 ff., 209 ff., Elmer has protested against the indiscriminate rendering of the Latin subjunctive by the modal auxiliaries 'can', 'could', 'might' (in the sense of 'could'). In the main I am confident that all scholars will view his attitude with approval; but with regard to one category of uses, I am equally confident that we should recognize the existence in Latin of the 'can' and 'could' potential. I refer to uses of the indefinite second singular, such as *videas, videres*, 'one can see', 'one could (might) see.' As 'one could (might) see' is perhaps ambiguous owing to the vagueness of our English 'could', 'might', I will say that I am here using these auxiliaries in the sense of the German *konnte*, in *man konnte sehen*. Outside of the indefinite second singular of the present and imperfect, I do not believe that the usage referred to ought to be recognized; within these limits I do not see how it can be successfully disputed.

The following material¹ will serve as an adequate basis for discussion:

Present.

Plaut. *Aul.* 506,

Nunc quoquo venias plus plaustorum in aedibus

Videas quam ruri quando ad villam veneris.

Capt. 418,

Di vostram fidem

Hominum ingenium liberale! ut lacrimas excutiant mihi!

Videas corde amare inter se.

¹ This list makes no claim to completeness.

Curc. 291,

Obstant, obsistunt, incedunt cum suis sententiis :

Quos semper videas bibentes esse in thermipolio.

Most. 243, videas eam medullitus me amare.

Poen. 585,

Ibi habitant, ibi eos conspicias quam praetorem saepius.

ibid. 830,

Di vostram fidem :

Quodvis genus ibi hominum videas, quasi Acheruntem veneris.

ibid. 836, Ibi tu videas litteratas fictiles epistulas

Pice signatas.

Pseud. 1175,

Quamvis pernix hic est homo.

Ubi suram aspicias, scias posse eum gerere crassas compedes.

Ter. Heaut. 1063,

Heia, ut elegans est : credas animum ibi esse.

Cic., pro Murena 17, 36, nam ut tempestates saepe certo aliquo caeli signo commoventur, saepe improvise nulla ex certa ratione, obscura aliqua ex causa concitantur, sic in hac comitiorum tempestate populari saepe intellegas quo signo commota sit ; saepe ita obscura est ut casu excitata esse videatur.

de Div. ii. 21, 48, sed cum multa sunt detracta et ad liniamenta oris perventum est, tum intellegas illud, quod iam expolitum sit, intus fuisse.

ad Att. i. 16, 10, 'domum', inquit, 'emisti.' 'Putes', inquam 'dicere 'iudices emisti.'

Seneca, de Ira. iii. 7, 1, Idem accidere in rebus civilibus ac domesticis scias.

Ps- Quint., Decl. cclxviii. (p. 94, l. 21, Ritter), quosdam videas odio pecuniae ferri expositosque, veluti ad provocandas calamitates.

Tacitus, Germ. 45, sucum (*viz.*, amber) tamen arborum esse intellegas, quia terrena quaedam atque etiam volucra animalia plerumque interlucent, quae implicata umore mox durescente materia cluduntur.

Juvenal, 5, 121,

Structorem interea, ne qua indignatio desit,
Saltantem spectes et chironomunta volanti
Cultello.

Fronto, *Principia hist.* p. 206, 7 (Naber), Eius itinerum monumenta videas per plurimas Asiae atque Europae urbes.

Imperfect.

Ter. *Ad.* 828, scires liberum ingenium atque animum.

Sall. *Cat.* 25, 3, pecuniae an famae minus parceret, haud facile discerneres.

ibid. 61, 1, confecto proelio, tum vero cerneres quanta audacia quantaque vis animi fuisset in exercitu Catilinae.

Vell. Paterc. ii. 25, 1, putares Sullam venisse in Italiam non belli vindicem sed pacis auctorem.

Hor. *Sat.* i. 5, 75,

Convivas avidos cenam servosque timentes
Tum rapere atque omnes restinguere velle videres.

id. *Sat.* ii. 8, 77,

tum in lecto quoque videres

Stridere secreta divisos aure susurros.

Livy, ii. 43, 9, iniussu signa referunt maestique (crederes victos) redeunt in castra.

id. xxi. 4, 3, haud facile discerneres, utrum imperatori an exercitui carior esset.

Curtius, vi. 2, 16, signum datum crederes ut vasa colligerent.

Tac. *Agr.*, 44, bonum virum facile crederes.

id. *Hist.*, i. 57, scires illum priore biduo non penes rem publicam fuisse.

Whatever the nature of the subjunctive in the foregoing examples, it is apparent that we are dealing at least with homogeneous material. All of the subjunctives are of words of *seeing*¹, *per-*

¹videas (7 times), videres (2), conspicias, aspicias, spectes.

*ceiving*¹, *thinking*², *knowing*³, *believing*⁴; the forms also are all in the 2d singular used with indefinite force.

Elmer (p. 205) suggests that *videas*, in examples like those under consideration, may be taken in either of two ways:

1. As a Jussive in the sense of 'you may see (*i. e.*, it is permitted you to see).'

2. As a Subjunctive of Contingent Futurity ('Potential'), 'you would see (if you should take the trouble to look).'

But when we come to apply either of these views to the material under discussion, we become involved in insuperable difficulties. Let us take, for example, Plautus, *Capt.*, 418 f.:

Di vostram fidem,

Hominum ingenium liberale! Ut lacrimas excutiant mihi!

Videas corde amare inter se.

It is clearly impossible here to regard *videas* as a jussive in the sense of 'you may see.' It is true, beyond question, that the jussive does often secondarily acquire the value of a clause of permission in the sense of 'you may', 'he may', 'they may', etc. But I have yet to find an instance of this sort where the jussive force does not continue to persist and where the jussive translation does not do full justice to the sense of the passage. Cf. the extensive material gathered by Elmer on this point (pp. 35 ff.): for example, Plaut. *Bacch.*, 502, *Illum exoptavit potius? habeat: optumest.* ('She preferred him? Let her have him. 'Tis well'); id. *Curc.*, 178, *Sibi sua habeant regna reges, sibi divitias divites.* ('Let kings have their realms, grantees their wealth'), and so on. The jussive force is always obvious and the jussive rendering is always pat. The rendering 'may' is often admissible as an alternative; yet it is never necessary. Even when it is admissible, it is not such a 'may' as Elmer suggests for the *videas* of Plaut. *Capt.*, 420, and similar passages. The 'may' which is admissible as an alternative ren-

¹intellegas (3), discerneres (2), cerneres.

²putes, putares.

³scias (2), scires (2).

⁴credas, crederes (3).

dering of the jussive, is a 'may' which is equivalent to the Latin *te sino, eum (eam, eos) sino, i. e.*, 'they may for aught I care', 'meinetwegen darf er, dürfen sie', etc. In other words, it is a purely *subjective* 'may'—a 'may' indicating that the speaker waives his own preference. The only 'may' applicable to *videas* in *Capt.*, 420, and to the other instances under discussion is a 'may' which, according to Elmer's rendering, would be equivalent to the Latin *tibi licet, ei (eis) licet*; in other words, it is a purely *objective* 'may', in which the speaker's will is not even remotely involved. No such secondary use of the jussive with the force of *tibi licet* in this objective sense is known to Latin grammar. Elmer, I am confident, has been misled by the identity of phrase in these two uses of 'may' to consider them logically and syntactically equivalent. Yet, quite apart from that, I should insist that the interpretation which he suggests does great violence to the sense of the passage under discussion. One has only to substitute *tibi licet videre* for *videas* in Plautus, *Capt.* 420, or *licet* with the infinitive for any of the other present subjunctives above enumerated in order to appreciate the force of this objection.

Elmer's proposal to take these subjunctives as jussives with permissive force must, therefore, be rejected. Let us examine his alternative proposition, *viz.* : to take them as subjunctives of contingent futurity ('should', 'would' potentials),—'You would see, think, perceive,' etc. In accordance with this view, the passage from Plautus, *Capt.* 420f., would mean 'Good heavens! What noble-minded fellows! How they bring the tears to my eyes! You would see that they love each other with all their hearts.' But here again, I believe that all must feel how inappropriate to the context this rendering is. To take *videas* as 'would see' implies the existence of some contingency under which the seeing would take place. Elmer suggests, 'if you would take the trouble.' But the phenomenon referred to is evidently one which one does not have to take any trouble to see; it is one which thrusts itself upon the observer. All notion of contingency seems to me to be absent from the passage referred to, and also from the other similar passages. In their origin, they were undoubtedly

subjunctives of contingent futurity, but I think it must be clear to all that they have so far grown away from their first force as now to convey an entirely different notion. To my mind the English 'can' comes nearer expressing the idea thus secondarily developed than any other modal auxiliary. Originally, perhaps, the thought in these expressions was: 'You would see, if you should look', but evidently it soon came to be taken for granted that the subject of the verb *was* present; in this way the 'can' meaning would naturally arise. Such a development from the 'would' meaning to the 'can' meaning ought to be no more surprising than the development in subordinate clauses from the 'would' idea to the idea of actuality, as seen, for example, in clauses of characteristic. In these the subjunctive was originally of the 'would' type; thus *nemo est qui velit*, originally meant, 'there is no one who would wish', but from this it has developed the notion, 'there is no one who wishes.' The two cases are, of course, not identical, but they are clearly analogous.

I turn to the imperfects occurring in this idiom. Among these we find the same verbs as already considered above in our discussion of the present. Thus, corresponding to *videas* we find *videres*; corresponding to *scias* we find *scires*; to *putes*, *putares*, etc. Hence the conclusion naturally suggests itself that these imperfects are but presents projected into the past.¹ Therefore, if we have rightly taken the presents *videas*, *scias*, *putes*, *intellegas*, etc., as 'can' potentials, we shall regard these imperfects as 'could' potentials. An examination of the passages above cited clearly shows that this meaning fits the context perfectly. A typical instance is Hor. *Sat.* ii. 8, 77, *tum in lecto quoque videres susurros*, 'then one could notice', *i. e.*, everybody present could notice,—the whispers were notice-able. Elmer (p. 208) strangely interprets 'you would (certainly) have seen it, *i. e.*, if you had been there.' This rendering requires us to take *videres* as a definite 2d singular, and we get the pointless observation of the poet to his listener that, if the latter had been present, he would have ob-

¹Elmer (p. 207) admits that the two categories (present and imperfect) are to be judged alike. Probably no one would dissent from this.

served the whispering. Similar difficulties arise in connection with every one of the other imperfects above cited, so soon as we attempt to apply the interpretation suggested by Elmer. His interpretation, moreover, would lead us to expect the pluperfect tense, not the imperfect ; for he regards the usage in question as a virtual apodosis of a contrary to fact condition referring to the past. To be sure the imperfect is sometimes used referring to the past in conditional sentences of this type, but as a rule only when the reference is to a continued action in past time or to an act belonging to the past and continuing into the present, neither of which features is discoverable in the expressions under discussion. In these, the aoristic force is pronounced, and the pluperfect tense does not once occur.

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE FORCE OF TENSES IN THE PROHIBITIVE.

In the *American Journal of Philology*, Vol. xv, No. 2, Elmer has discussed the force of tenses in the prohibitive. His conclusions were that the perfect subjunctive occurs in this idiom wherever special energy or emotion on the speaker's part is present, the present subjunctive in other cases. These conclusions seemed to me so plausible that I accepted them and incorporated them in my *Latin Grammar* (§ 276); cf. *Appendix*, § 358, 1, *d*. Three subsequent readings of Plautus, however, tended to shake my confidence in the validity of the theory, and prompted me to institute a fresh examination of the question for Plautus, in whose plays the construction is best represented.¹ The results of this examination are here given.

The investigation of this question is naturally a somewhat delicate one. Where the problem is to determine the presence or absence of "special emotion or excitement", no two persons would probably agree entirely in their judgment concerning the 135 instances of prohibitive expressions involved in this discussion. Most prohibitive expressions, whatever their form, naturally convey some emotion; a prohibition is itself the mark of emotion and excitement. Special emotion or excitement, I have taken to mean emotion or excitement distinctly recognizable as stronger than the ordinary type. When danger threatens, a prohibition prompted by fear of what is impending or by a desire to ward it off, seems to me naturally to convey special emotion. Similarly, eager haste, anxiety for the successful performance of a cherished plan, evident indignation or resentment, all are forms

¹Plautus has 34 instances of the perfect tense, and 63 of the present tense in the prohibitive use. Besides this he has 30 instances of *cave* with the perfect, and 8 of *cave* with the present. Terence has a total of fewer than 25 instances of these four types. Outside of comedy the construction is rare.

of special emotion. Proceeding upon this view of special emotion, I have felt constrained to deny the presence of special excitement or emotion in the majority of prohibitions in Plautus in the perfect subjunctive. On the other hand I have felt constrained to recognize the presence of special emotion in a large proportion of prohibitions expressed by means of the present subjunctive.

A.

Ne with Perfect Subjunctive.

I follow Elmer's order, but cite by the Götz-Schöll text of Plautus.

Amph., 924, Per dexteram tuam te, Alcumena, oro, obsecro, Da mi hanc veniam, ignosce, irata ne sies. Elmer here observes that *irata sies* is evidently the perfect of *irascor*. But *irascor* is not used in the perfect system (Krebs-Schmalz, *Anti barbarus*, p. 726 f.); *irata* therefore is an adjective, and *sies* merely illustrates the capacity of the present to express special emotion.

Mil. Glo., 281 f.,

SC. Nescis tu fortasse apud nos facinus quod natumst novom.

PA. Quod id est facinus? SC. Impudicum. PA. Tute scias soli tibi :

Mihi ne dixis : scire nolo.

I can detect here no evidence of special excitement or emotion. Elmer observes : "notice the many indications of earnest feeling : *Tute* (*tu* alone even would have been emphatic), *soli tibi*, and all sharply contrasted with *mihi*." But the sharp contrast between the pronouns does not involve the presence of special emotion in the verb. Palaestrio in this passage has simply asked what has happened, and upon Sceledrus's declaring that it was something scandalous, he says, 'Keep it to yourself, then. You don't need to tell me. I don't care to know.' That he is not actuated by special emotion seems clear from the fact that Sceledrus is allowed at once to proceed with his story without further protest.

ibid. 862, ne dixeritis, is without question an instance of special emotion.

ibid. 1333, *ne interveneris, quaeso, dum resipiscit*, gives clear evidence of special emotion.

Rudens 1155, *Perii in primo proelio : mane : ne ostenderis*, gives evidence of special excitement.

Trin. 521, *Per deos atque homines dico, ne tu illunc agrum Tuom siris umquam fieri*, shows special excitement.

ibid. 704, *Id me commissurum ut patiar fieri, ne animum induxeris*.

Elmer observes that Lysiteles is here "indignant at anything that might reflect upon his character." This seems an overstatement. The situation is this: Lesbonicus is generously proposing to impoverish himself in order to provide a dowry for his sister, whom Lysiteles is to marry. Lysiteles wants no dowry and refuses to accept any, observing that such conduct would bring him ill-repute. But he is hardly indignant or excited. Nor could one friend well feel indignation at so generous an act as that proposed by Lesbonicus. Lysiteles, in saying *ne animum induxeris*, hardly means more than 'rest assured.'

ibid. 1012, *ne destiteris currere*. These words are those of a slave, who is hurrying home and speaks thus to himself. Elmer says the fellow is in dread of a flogging. But the slave seems rather to cherish the hope of escaping a flogging. He feels it is time to be getting home, and merely urges himself to keep on running. Similar scenes are frequent, in which slaves thus soliloquize and exhort themselves to escape punishment where there is no special danger of incurring it.

Asin. 837 ff.,

SON—An tu me tristem putas?

FATHER—Putem ego quem videam aequae esse maestum, ut quasi dies si dicta sit?

SON—Ne dixis istuc. FATHER—Ne sic fueris: ilico ego non dixero.

SON—Em, aspecta, rideo.

There is no trace of excitement here in either *ne dixis* or *ne fueris*. Elmer's observation on *ne dixis* is, "in a tone of earnest deprecation at his father's taunt." The father had said to the son, 'You look serious.' The son retorts, 'Don't say that',

whereupon the father says, 'Don't look so then ; then I won't say so.' At this the son gives a stage grin, upon which the father makes an amusing comment. I can see nothing but a tone of cheerful banter in the whole passage.

Curc. 599,

PL. Phaedrome, propera. PH. Quid properem? PL. Parasitum ne amiseris :

Magna res est.

Here *ne amiseris* is not prohibitive, but a purpose clause, dependent upon *propera*, — 'Hurry Phaedromus.' 'What for?' 'To catch the parasite : it's important.' Morris also, *Am. Jour. Phil.* xviii. p. 164, apparently takes *amiseris* as a dependent subjunctive.

Pseud. 79,

PS. Quid faciam tibi?

CA. Eheu. PS. Eheu? Id quidem hercle ne parsis ; dabo.

This is the merest chaffing. Pseudolus asks his master, 'What do you want?' The master says 'Eheu'. Pseudolus, for comic effect, retorts, 'Want "eheu", do you? Well, don't restrain your wishes in that respect. I'll give you all you want.'

Most. 1097, ne occupassis, obsecro, aram. Despite the presence of *obsecro*, I am confident that there is no excitement in this prohibition. Excitement is dramatically impossible. Theopropides's tone here can only be one of gentle coaxing ('Please, I would n't occupy the altar'). An impassioned prohibition would have been certain to defeat the object which he hopes to realize.

Men. 415, Ne feceris! periisti si intrassis intra limen, shows special excitement.

ibid. 611, At tu ne clam me comesses. *Comesses* is the text of all our MSS, and is a thoroughly defensible reading, as shown above in the discussion of 'The Subjunctive of Obligation and Propriety', p. 27f. The reading *comessis*, adopted by Elmer without comment, is the gratuitous conjecture of Bothe ; the perfect is entirely out of place here, while the imperfect 'you ought not to have eaten' is thoroughly in point, and is defended by other similar uses both in Plautus and in other writers. *Ne comesses*,

accordingly, cannot be ranked as a prohibitive, and therefore has no bearing upon the present discussion.

Epid. 148, *Ne feceris*. Elmer says, "in answer to Stratippocles's intimation that he would commit suicide". Stratippocles's words were: *Nunc patierin ut ego me interimam?* But this is hardly more than the pathetic inquiry, 'Are n't you going to do anything for me?' There is no serious declaration of a purpose to commit suicide, and Epidicus can have no real apprehensions of danger. His *ne feceris*, accordingly, is scarcely more than a comforting 'I would n't do that. I'll sooner run a risk for you.'

ibid. 595, *Ubi voles pater esse, ibi esto: ubi noles, ne fueris pater*. There is absolutely no trace of excitement here. The words are those of a *fidicina*, hired to play the part of the long lost daughter of Periphanes. Periphanes discovers the imposture, and forbids the girl to call him father. She replies with the utmost nonchalance, 'All right! When you want to be my father, be so; when you don't, you need n't.'

Poen. 553, *Nos tu ne curassis*. These are the words of the witnesses whom Agorastocles has called to his assistance. Elmer observes; "The tone assumed here by the speakers may be inferred from the fact that they have just been accused of speaking with too much anger." But the passage where the witnesses were charged with show of feeling is thirteen lines previous to the *ne curassis* under discussion, and meanwhile the witnesses and Agorastocles had settled their trivial difference and passed to another matter. The witnesses now say, 'Tell the situation to the spectators. Never mind us (*nos ne curassis*); we know of course'. No vestige of special excitement is here discernible.

ibid. 993, *ne parseris*. There is no trace of excitement here. A stranger appears on the scene, and Agorastocles simply tells his servant to approach the man and inquire his name, his country and his business. *Ne parseris* means no more than 'Omit nothing'. The context suggests no ground for recognition of any excitement.

Aul. 100, *ne intromiseris*. With Morris (*Am. Jour. Phil.* xviii, p. 164) I should regard this as dependent upon the preceding *praedico*.

ibid. 585, *ne tu immutassis nomen, si hoc concreduo*. These are the words of Euclio, addressed to the goddess Fides, in whose temple he is depositing his pot of treasure. But there is no excitement. The entire passage is one of calm confidence (*cf.* 586, *Ibo fretus tua, Fides, fiducia*). Euclio says (v. 582 f.), 'Now it's best for me to carry you, O pot, to Fides's shrine; that 'll be a good place to hide you. O Fides, you know me and I know you. Don't change your name, if I trust this pot to you.'

ibid. 744, *Ne istuc dixis*. This very likely should be taken as exhibiting excitement.

ibid. 790, *Ne me uno digito attigeris, ne te ad terram, scelus, adfligam*. This reference should be *Persa*, 793. The passage shows special excitement.

Cas. 404, *ne obiexis manum*. This is metrically impossible. With Götz and Schöll, I should read *cave obiexis* (Bothes' conj.). This brings the expression under another category.

Cist. 110, *nequid dixeris*. I doubt whether any excitement should be recognized here. The girl simply says to her friend: 'If my lover comes, don't upbraid him. I love him still. Be gentle with him, and utter no word that might wound his heart.'

Merc. 401, 402, *ne duas neu te advexisse dixeris*. I can see no sign of excitement here in *ne dixeris* any more than in *ne duas*. The two prohibitions are absolutely parallel. If anything, *ne duas*, where Elmer would claim no special excitement, is stronger here than *ne dixeris*. Elmer himself, however, admits that the special emotion involved in *ne dixeris* has here sunk to a minimum.

The foregoing are all the examples for Plautus given by Elmer. There are, however, thirteen additional examples, some of which he apparently overlooked, others of which he probably took as Subjunctives of 'Obligation or Propriety.' The truly prohibitive character of such subjunctives however, has, I hope, already been made sufficiently clear by the discussion on pages 1-30. The thirteen examples are the following:

Most. 1115, *Ne faxis: nam elixus esse quam assus soleo suavior*. These words are those of Tranio. His master Theopropides in the extravagance of his rage has threatened to burn

him. Tranio, secure in the protection of the altar at which he has taken refuge, blandly answers, 'Oh, I would n't. I'm much nicer boiled than baked.'

Persa. 572, Ne sis ferro parseris. No one can detect any vestige of excitement here, I am confident. The whole passage, too, abounds in presents coördinate with *ne parseris*.

Truc. 606, Istuc ne mihi responsis. This seems excited.

Bacch. 90, tu nullus adfueris, si non lubet. This means, 'Don't help, if you don't want to'. As a prohibition it is one of the weakest imaginable.

Capt. 149, nunquam istuc dixis neque animum induxis tuom. This is a case of genuine excitement.

Curc. 384, Nil tu me saturum monueris; memini. The words are those of Curculio speaking to those within. He says, 'No need to remind me after a square meal. I remember.'

Mil. Glo. 1006, Hercle hanc quidem Nil tu amassis. This means, 'Oh, don't love her. She's betrothed to me!' There is no excitement.

Most. 272, PHIL. Etiamne unguentis unguendam censes? SC. Minume feceris. Here there is no excitement whatever in *Minume feceris*. It is simply a commonplace 'No' in reply to a commonplace question.

ibid. 526, Nil me curassis, inquam. This betrays excitement.

Pseud. 232, Nil curassis: liquido's animo: ego pro me et pro te curabo. Here *nil curassis* is the mildest sort of phrase. It is simply a 'Don't worry'.

Rud. 1027 f., Sine me hinc abire: tu abi tacitus tuam viam, Neque tu me quoquam indicassis, neque ego tibi quicquam dabo.

The two *neque* clauses are virtually subordinate. As the context shows, the passage means, 'Go quietly away, without mentioning my name to any one, and without my giving you any part of my find.' There is no excitement.

Stich. 149, Neque ego te celabo neque tu me celassis quod scias. The prohibition here is of the mildest possible sort.

Trin. 627, Sta ilico: noli avorsari neque te occultassis mihi. The prohibition here shows strong emotion.

The foregoing list, I am confident, contains all the instances in Plautus of the perfect subjunctive in prohibitions. According to the interpretations above given, there are 11 instances where special excitement is noticeable, 23 instances where no excitement exists. Five instances claimed by Elmer as instances of the prohibitive were eliminated for various cogent reasons. I pass to the consideration of the perfect subjunctive with *cave*.

B.

Cave and the Perfect Subjunctive.

Amph. 608, *Cave quicquam, nisi quod rogabo te, mihi responderis.* I can detect no special emotion here.

Mil. Glo. 1125, *Istuc cave faxis.* These words are simply those of calm advice.

ibid. 1245, *Nisi perdere istam gloriam vis quam habes, cave sis faxis.* Here again we have no excitement, but merely calm counsel.

ibid. 1368, *Cave istuc feceris.* These are the words of Palaestrio. The Miles, after granting him the desired opportunity of departing is proposing now to retain him in his service. Palaestrio says simply, 'I would n't do it', and gives reasons why the proposed act is unwise. Moreover it is dramatically impossible that Palaestrio here should give utterance to an emotional prohibition. Any such exclamation would have tended to rouse suspicion on the Miles's part and to betray the whole plot.

ibid. 1371,

Nam si honeste censeam te facere posse, suadeam.

Verum non potest : cave faxis.

This is a continuation of the previous passage and of the same theme. *Suadeam* shows sufficiently that *cave faxis* like *cave feceris* in 1368 is simply calm advice.

Trin. 513, *Cave sis feceris.* This apparently is an emotional prohibition.

ibid. 555, *Cave sis dixeris, me tibi dixisse hoc,* 'Please don't mention that I told you this.' The words are only a parting reminder. There has been no threat of disclosure.

Asin. 256, *Serva erum: cave tu idem faxis alii quod servi solent.* The words are part of the soliloquy of a slave. They constitute the mildest kind of self-exhortation.

ibid. 467, *Hercle istum di omnes perduint. Verbo cave supplicassis.* Excitement is manifest.

ibid. 625, *Verbum cave faxis, verbero.* Excitement is manifest.

Bacch. 402, *Cave sis te superare servom siris faciundo bene.* These words are a part of Mnesilochus's soliloquy. Like *Asin.* 256, they constitute only a mild self-exhortation.

ibid. 909, *ted opsecro, cave parsis in eum dicere.* Excitement is manifest.

ibid. 1188, *quod di dant boni cave culpa tua amissis, i. e.,* 'It's a pity to let the blessings pass which the gods offer.'

Stichus, 284, *Age ut placet, curte ut lubet: cave quemquam flocci feceris.* This is another slave's soliloquy. The speaker is certainly eager and possibly excited.

Most. 401, (Elmer's, 388), *Intus cave muttire quemquam siveris.* The excitement here is manifest.

ibid. 523 (Elmer's, 508), *Cave respexis, fuge, operi caput.* The excitement here is manifest.

ibid. 808 (Elmer's, 795), *Cave tu ullam flocci faxis mulierem. Qualubet perambula aedis.* The prohibition here is exceedingly mild,—'You needn't mind the women. Go wherever you wish.'

Men. 994, *Cave quisquam quod illic minitetur vostrum flocci fecerit.* There is evident excitement here.

Epid. 400, *Cave siris cum filia mea copulari.* There is manifest excitement here.

ibid. 439, *Incertus tuom cave ad me rettuleris pedem.* There is no excitement or emotion here. The second verse before this contains *cave* with the present (*cave praeterbitas ullas aedis*) in exactly the same sense.

Merc. 113, *Abige abs te lassitudinem: cave pigritiae prae-vorteris.* This is part of another slave soliloquy, and contains merely a mild self-exhortation.

ibid. 484, *Cave tu istuc dixis.* The words are those of Eutyclus, who, in replying to the query of the love-lorn Charinus,

has inquired in what manner he had better make way with himself. Eutychus's reply is evidently intended to dissuade from such talk rather than to reprove.

Poen. 1023, Cave sis feceris quod hic te orat. The Punic context makes it impossible to determine whether there be any special excitement here. Probably there is none. The whole passage is one of deliberate chaffing.

Aul. 90, Cave quemquam alienum in aedis intromiseris. This may denote excitement.

ibid. 608, Tu modo cave quoiqum indicassis aurum meum esse istic, Fides. There is no excitement here; simply a calm and confident request. The speaker entertains no fear, as he himself declares in the very next line: Non metuo ne quisquam inveniāt.

ibid. 618, Cave tu illi fidelis, quaeso, potius fueris quam mihi. There may be a certain degree of excitement here, as indicated by *quaeso* and by the preceding context.

Persa. 389, Cave sis tu istuc dixeris, 'Please don't say that'. The words are the reply of a father to a daughter who had spoken of herself as *indotata*. There is absolutely no excitement. The present tense with *ne* (*ne te indotatam dicas*) occurs in the same sense in the next line but one.

ibid. 933, I cannot find this passage. The play contains only 857 lines.

Cas. 332, Tu istos minutos cave deos flocci feceris. There is no excitement here. The words are spoken in the merest levity.

The foregoing are all the examples in Elmer's list. A few others remain to be considered.

ibid. 404, Cave obiexis manum. This reading rests upon conjecture, but is supported by metrical considerations; the MSS. read *Ne* instead of *Cave*. The passage shows decided excitement.

Cist. 300, Cave sis cum Amore tu umquam bellum sumpseris. This is merely a mild admonition. Cf. 299, *Mone*.

Truc. 943, Cave faxis.

Vid. 83, Cave tu istuc dixis.

ibid. 91, Cave demutassis.

In these last three passages the context is so uncertain that it is impossible to determine with any degree of satisfaction the character of the prohibition.

According to the foregoing interpretations, there are, therefore, 12 instances of *cave* with the perfect subjunctive which show excitement, 18 which show no excitement, and three passages which are uncertain. The frequency of passages characterized by strong emotion is almost the same as noted in our examination of prohibitions expressed by *ne* with the perfect subjunctive.

C.

Ne with the Present Subjunctive.

Elmer gives 81 instances of prohibitions in Plautus expressed by *ne* with the present subjunctive. Of this number he himself candidly admits that many may be taken as subordinate. As a matter of fact, some 25 instances are almost necessarily so taken and are mostly so regarded by Götz and Schöll, if one may judge by their punctuation. A few other instances included in Elmer's list have been excluded for other reasons given below. In all, I have excluded 28 instances as follows. The passages which Elmer himself admits to be probably or possibly subordinate are marked with a star.

Amph. 87, *ne miremini*. I should take this as a purpose clause introductory to the following *acturust Juppiter*. Götz and Schöll apparently take it as independent; but in that case *ne miremini* is a mere repetition of *Mirari nolim nos* in the preceding verse.

ibid. 116, *ne admiremini*, also seems to me subordinate.

* *Capt.* 14, *ne erres*. Cf. Morris, *The Subj. in Plautus*, *Am. Journ. Phil.*, xviii, p. 149.

ibid. 331, *Eum si reddis mihi, praeterea unum nummum ne duis*,

Et te et hunc amittam.

The passage means, 'If you restore my son to me, I will release both you and your companion, without your paying me a penny beside.' The clause *ne duis* is subordinate and of the kind which

I have above (p. 21) designated as Stipulative. Examples abound in Plautus. Cf. *Bacch.* 873,

Vis tibi ducentos nummos iam promittier,

Ut ne clamorem hic facias neu convicium?

I. e. 'on the understanding that you are not to make an uproar.'

ibid. 854, ne frustra sis. Subordinate, and so punctuated by Götz and Schöll. Cf. Morris, *l. c.*

Rud. 941 b, ne postules, I should take as probably subordinate, though Götz and Schöll do not so punctuate. Cf. Morris, *l. c.*

ibid. 969, ne frustra sis. Subordinate, and so punctuated by Götz and Schöll. Cf. Morris, *l. c.*

ibid. 1012, ne postules. Subordinate; so Götz and Schöll.

ibid. 1414, ne tu speres. Subordinate; so Götz and Schöll.

**Bacch.* 747, ne verberes. This is a substantive clause, used as the object of *memineris* in the preceding verse.

ibid. 758, ne quoquam exsurgatis. This may be independent, but it may also, like *eatis* in 755 and *poletis* in 756, be a substantive clause and object of *facite*.

Stich. 446, ne miremini. This seems to me naturally taken as a purpose clause, though Götz and Schöll take it as independent.

Most. 1005, Ne censeas. I should take as subordinate, though Götz and Schöll do not. Cf. Morris, *l. c.*

Epid. 339. The text here is hopeless.

**Merc.* 465, ad portum ne bitas dico iam tibi. *Ne bitas* is best taken as an object clause.

ibid. 528, Nunc mulier, ne tu frustra sis, mea non es. Subordinate.

**Poen.* 527, Ne tu opinere. Subordinate.

**ibid.* 537, Ne conteras. Subordinate.

**ibid.* 1155, ne dictum neges. Subordinate.

Aul. 240, Eo dico, ne censeas. *Ne censeas* is unquestionably a purpose clause.

ibid. 358, ne quaeras foris. *Ne quaeras* is probably a purpose clause. Götz and Schöll apparently so take it.

ibid. 457, Lege agito mecum, molestus ne sis. I should take *molestus ne sis* as 'stipulative', — 'Sue me if you want to, if you'll only stop your noise.'

Pers. 140, *ne frustra sis.* Subordinate ; so Götz and Schöll.

Truc. 667, *Ne me morari censeas.* This is subordinate ; so Götz and Schöll.

ibid. 754, The text here is hopelessly corrupt.

Cas. 64, *ne exspectetis.* This may be a mere purpose clause, introductory to *non redibit.*

ibid. 394, *Ne memores aut suspices.* This, I think, is unquestionably subordinate ; so Götz and Schöll.

Cist. 558, *ne censeas.* Subordinate ; so Götz and Schöll.

After the elimination of the foregoing there remain 59 instances of unquestioned prohibitives expressed by means of *ne* with the present subjunctive. Of these, no fewer than 23 exhibit strong emotion and special excitement on the part of the speaker ; the remaining 36 instances show no excitement. I give these 36 instances first :

Capt. 58, *ne vereamini.*

ibid. 186, *ne postules.*

ibid. 349, *ne vereare.*

ibid. 393, *istuc ne praecipias.*

ibid. 957, *ne spem ponas.*

Mil. Glo. 1215, *ne sis cupidus.*

ibid. 1274, *ne mirere mulierem.*

ibid. 1361, *ne morere.*

ibid. 1363, *ne me deseras.*

ibid. 1378, *ne me moneatis.*

ibid. 1422, *ne sis frustra.*

Merc. 528, *ne arbitrere.*

Rud. 1368, *ne duis.*

Trin. 16, *ne exspectetis.*

ibid. 370, *ne prohibeas.*

Curc. 183, *ne occlamites.*

ibid. 213, *ne rogites.*

ibid. 565, *ne facias testis.*

Pseud. 275 *ne praedices.*

ibid. 1234, *ne expectetis.*

Most. 613 (Elmer's, 598), *ne postules.*

ibid. 628 (Elmer's, 611), ne censeas.

ibid. 812 (Elmer's, 799), ne videare.

ibid. 1023, ne postules.

Men. 327, ne quo abeas.

Ep. 304, ne abitas.

Merc. 322, ne ducas.

ibid. 401, ne duas.

Poen. 1373, ne mirere.

Aul. 172, ne facias.

ibid. 238, ne duas.

ibid. 241, ne doceas.

Truc. 482, ne expectetis.

Cist. 782, ne exspectetis.

Besides the foregoing, an unemphatic *molestus ne sis* occurs
Most. 771; *Pseud.* 118.

I pass to a consideration of those passages in which *ne* with the present indicates special emotion or excitement on the part of the speaker.

Amph. 924, *irata ne sies*. Elmer takes *irata ne sies* as the perfect of *irascor*; but *irata* is always an adjective. (See above p. 49). He recognizes the presence of special excitement.

Capt. 947, At ob eam rem mihi libellam pro eo argenti ne duis. These words are the excited declaration of Hegio. With keen regret for the indignities inflicted upon Tyndarus and anxious to pacify Philocrates, he begs the latter to give him no money for the slave.

Rud. 968, Hunc homo feret a me nemo: ne tu te speres potis; the passionate declaration of Trachalio, fearful of losing the treasure,—‘No one shall take this from me. Don’t you dare to cherish the hope that you can!’

ibid. 992, ne feras. This seems to me to show excitement. The whole context warrants this view. Note especially *impure*, ‘You villain’, in v. 990.

ibid. 1385, ne tu, leno, postules te hic fide lenonia uti. While not so excited as some of the previous passages, this seems to me to betray considerable emotion.

ibid. 1390, Immo hercle mea : ne tu dicas tua. The emotion of the speaker here seems to me undeniable.

Trin. 267, Apage te amor : tuas res tibi habeto. Amor mihi amicus ne fuas umquam ; the excited utterance of a young man inveighing against Love's baneful influence.

Curc. 539, Ne te mi facias ferocem aut supplicare censeas ; the excited utterance of an enraged money-lender resenting what he supposes to be sharp practice on the part of another.

ibid. 568, 713, ne me territes. The greatest excitement characterizes these two passages. Elmer (p. 144) is unwilling to recognize this, but says, "the feeling in such cases is not that the failure to comply with '*ne territes*' will be disastrous to me, but that it will do you no good to try to frighten me." But whatever the equivalence of *ne territes*, no one can deny that the words are uttered with passionate energy, and this I conceive to be the point at issue.

Stichus, 320, Tua quod nil refert, ne cures ; an excited 'Mind your business !'

Men. 789, Quid ille faciat ne id observes. As the previous context shows, *ne observes* is characterized by great excitement. The father is upbraiding his daughter for neglecting his previous frequent admonitions, and has just said, 'What do you ask me such a question for? How many times have I told you to humor your husband's whims !'

Epid. 145, meam domum ne inbitas. This passage is characterized by great excitement. Stratippocles forbids Epidicus to enter his house and threatens him with punishment of the direst sort, if he does not forthwith secure the necessary funds.

Merc. 165, Ne rogites. This is certainly spoken with great emotion and seems to me properly classed under cases characterized by special excitement.

Poen. 521, Ne tuo nos amori servos esse addictos censeas. The resentment of the speakers is manifest in the whole context. The previous verse contains the words *nos te nili pendimus*.

Capt. 548, Ne tu quod istic fabuletur auris inmittas tuas. Here there is great excitement on the part of the speaker. Elmer admits that we should expect excitement, but urges that the speaker

in the effort to control his emotion designedly uses the present as the tense of unemotional utterance. This explanation seems to me dictated rather by a desire to make the context fit a preconceived theory than by a consistent endeavor to determine actual usage. I believe it will appeal to few. A peremptory excited prohibition is dramatically more natural here than anything else. It only mars the passage to take it otherwise.

There are also seven passages containing a *molestus ne sis* betraying special excitement :

Asin. 469, *aufer te domum, abscede hinc, molestus ne sis.* Here strong emotion is manifest. In verse 467 occur the words, *Herde istum di omnes perduint. Verbo cave supplicassis.* This last phrase has already been taken as indicating excitement.

Men. 250. This, as the context shows, is the sharp reprimand of a master to a slave.

Most. 74, 601, 877, 886. The context shows excitement in all four of these passages.

Pseud. 889. There is every reason to recognize the presence of excitement.

To the foregoing examples I would add :

Bacch. 903 (not included by Elmer), *Exige ac suspende te : ne supplicare censeas.* Great excitement is here manifest.

Vid. 51. *Nec duis.*

ibid. 52. *Ne duis.*

ibid. 85, *nullum duis.*

The context makes it impossible to determine the force of any of these three instances.

Of the 63 prohibitions in Plautus, therefore, expressed by means of *ne* with the present subjunctive, 24 show special excitement, 36 show no special excitement, and 3 are uncertain.

D.

Cave with the Present Subjunctive.

The material here is scanty. Elmer's lists contains only eight instances of the present with *cave*. No one of these shows the presence of excitement. The eight examples are the following :

Capt. 431, cave tu mi iratus fuas.

ibid. 439, cave fidem fluxam geras.

Cas. 530, cave in quaestione mihi sis.

Epid. 437, cave praeterbitas ullas aedis.

Most. 810, cave tu illi obiectes nunc in aegritudine

Te has emisse.

ibid. 1025, cave quadraginta accepisse hinc te neges.

Persa 51, cave fuas mihi in quaestione.

Poen. 117, cave dirumpatis.

Four instances of *ne attigas* occur (*Bacch.* 445; *Most.* 468; *Epid.* 723; *Truc.* 276). These all show excitement except *Epid.* 723, which shows none at all. Like Elmer, I have refrained from classing this phrase under either the present or the perfect, since *attigam* is by many regarded as a relic of the strong aorist formation; cf. Lindsay, *Latin Language*, p. 464.

An instance of *cave attigas* occurs in *Persa*, 816. It shows excitement.

Summary.

The results of the previous examination may be summed up in the following table:

	Excitement.		No Excitement.
<i>Ne</i> with Perfect.....	11	(32%)	23
<i>Cave</i> with Perfect.....	12	(40%)	18
<i>Ne</i> with Present.....	24	(40%)	36
<i>Cave</i> with Present	0		8
<i>Ne attigas</i>	3		1
<i>Cave attigas</i>	1		0

In other words, there is no discoverable difference of emotional force in prohibitions, whether expressed by *ne* with the perfect subjunctive, by *cave* with the perfect subjunctive, or by *ne* with the present. Either of these forms *may* be used where emotion is present, but neither form is an index either of emotion or of the absence of emotion. The proportion of instances where emotion is present is practically constant in all of the three forms. Yet it is noteworthy, I think, that the proportion is actually larger in prohi-

bitions expressed by *ne* with the present¹ (40%) than in those expressed by *ne* with the perfect (32%). Instructive further is the occurrence, in the same passage, of both tenses without discernible difference of force. Thus :

Merc. 401, 402, Ne duas neu te advexisse dixeris.

Epid. 437, cave praeterbitas ullas aedis ; 439, Incertus tuom cave ad me rettuleris pedem.

Persa. 389, Cave sis tu istuc dixeris ; 391, ne te indotatam dicas.

Asin. 467, Verbo cave supplicassis ; 469, Molestus ne sis.

Cf. also *Curc.* 384, Nil tu me saturum monueris : memini et scio, with the two following :

Capt. 393, Istuc ne praecipias : facile memoria memini tamen,

Mil. Glo. 1378, Ne me moneatis : memini ego officium meum.

On p. 146 Elmer makes the point that verbs of mental action, 'Do not suppose', 'Do not be surprised', etc., are not found in prohibitions expressed by *ne* and *cave* with the perfect subjunctive, and seeks in this circumstance confirmation of his theory of the force of tenses. Whether his theory would be strengthened or not by any such absence, from the perfect, of verbs of mental action, I do not feel certain. But verbs of mental action are found repeatedly in perfect prohibitions, *e. g.* :

Trin. 704, ne animum induxeris, 'do not imagine.'

Capt. 149, neque animum induxis.

Curc. 384, nil me monueris.

Most. 526, nil me curassis.

Pseud. 232, nil curassis.

Stichus. 285, cave quemquam flocci feceris.

Most. 808, cave flocci feceris.

Men. 994, cave quisquam flocci fecerit.

¹ Morris also (*Am. Jour. Phil.* xviii, p. 150) recognizes the use of *ne* with the present as an expression of "sharp, emotional warnings". *Cf.* also Delbrück in Brugmann und Delbrück, *Grundriss*, iv. 2, p. 383. Delbrück rejects Elmer's distinctions as to the employment of tenses, and holds that the present is used of continuous acts, the perfect of momentary ones. I have not attempted to test this theory.

CHAPTER V.

MORRIS'S TREATMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT SUBJUNCTIVES IN PLAUTUS.

A.

Parataxis.

In the *American Journal of Philology*, vol. xviii. (1897), Nos. 71, 72, 73, Morris subjects to careful scrutiny all the independent subjunctives occurring in Plautus, classifying them by tenses, person, and number. One or two features in his treatment seem to me quite unsound. I refer first to those subjunctives which he classifies as paratactic. The material included under this head is extensive. Nearly every person and number of every tense furnishes instances of the alleged use,—often numerous instances. In my judgment a considerable number of the subjunctives regarded by Morris as paratactic cannot be so taken, and to my mind the probability is strong that the great bulk of the remainder are much better explained as hypotactic.

Whatever differences of detail may exist as to the conception of parataxis, all scholars, so far as I am aware, are at least agreed in recognizing its existence only when a sentence is capable of having a value for its own sake as well as for the purpose of determining more fully the meaning of another sentence.¹ In order to exhibit parataxis, the two sentences assumed to have the paratactic relation must each be capable of possessing an independent value.² Just so soon as one of the two clauses is not capable of functioning alone, but only in conjunction with its neighbor, we have subordination or hypotaxis. This, I think, must be conceded by all. It is equally

¹ Cf. Paul, *Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte*², p. 133.

² Cf. *ibid.* p. 133.

true that the presence or absence of any special subordinating sign is immaterial to the question of logical relationship. *Eos hoc moneo desinant* is not necessarily different from *Eos hoc moneo ut desinant* merely as a consequence of the absence of the *ut* in the former instance. The question is one that must be decided primarily on the basis of logical values, not by means of any purely external test. Examined in this light many of Morris's examples fail to conform to the conditions of parataxis; they do not possess an independent value, and are not capable of functioning alone, but only in conjunction with the environing clause; *i. e.*, they are not paratactic, but hypotactic. Thus in the *Amphitruo* Prologue, v. 8f. :

Et uti bonis vos vestrosque omnis nuntiis

Me adficere voltis, ea adferam, ea uti nuntiem,

Quae maxume in rem vostram communem sient,

adferam is taken by Morris as independent and paratactic. It is true that there is no subordinating sign, but evidently *adferam* is logically identical with the preceding infinitive *adficere* and the following *uti nuntiem*,—‘You wish me to bless you with good tidings, to bring you, and announce to you things that make for your common good.’ It is clearly impossible, I think, to conceive *adferam* as possessing an independent value here and functioning alone, as might possibly be conceivable, for instance, in such an expression as *habeas, licet*, ‘take her; you may’, *i. e.*, ‘you may take her’; *adferam*, possesses a significance only as related to *voltis*; in other words, it is clearly subordinate.

Amph. 12 :

Nam vos quidem id iam scitis concessum et datum

Mi esse ab dis aliis nuntiis praesim et lucro.

Morris takes *praesim* here as independent; but here again I find it equally impossible to see how *praesim* can be regarded as functioning alone. To me it has force only as connected with *concessum et datum* and as explaining the preceding *id*, and is as thoroughly subordinate as if the *ut* were present before it. In fact, the very presence of *id* seems naturally to indicate that the following verb must be hypotactic. It does not necessarily prove this, of course; cf. Dräger, *Hist. Synt.* ii³. p. 217 *ad fin.*

Similar to the foregoing are *Rud.* 681 and *Trin.* 681. The former of these passages reads: *quae vis vim mi afferam ipsa adigit.* Here *afferam* expresses a thought which is valid only as related to *adigit.* I am perfectly aware that, according to Morris's general view of the subjunctive as expressed in his paper, he believes the mood to have had no fairly definite original force (no *Grundbegriff*), and that he further holds that the force of the subjunctive, such as it was, was variously modified in actual usage by the circumstances of voice, mood, tense, number, person, and especially by the context. Yet I do not understand that he would assume to expect in parataxis any independent use of the subjunctive radically different from independent uses found outside of parataxis. Thus, p. 279, footnote, he objects (with perfect reason) to explaining *cave cadas* as developed from a paratactical potential ('look out, you may fall') on the ground that "*cadas* alone in Plautus would never mean 'you may fall.'" Now in the case of the *Rudens* passage under discussion, I have to confess that I can see no recognized use of the first person singular subjunctive that could possibly make sense in this context.

The *Trinummus* passage reads: *meam sororem tibi dem suades sine dote.* But here again *dem* has validity only as related to *suades.*

Asin. 876, *iam faxo ipsum hominem manifesto opprimas.* Here *opprimas* has validity only as related to *faxo*; there is no independent use of the subjunctive under which the word can be brought. The same criticism applies to all of the subjunctives following *faxo* cited by Morris, on p. 148, *e. g.*,

Amphitr. 511, *illa si istis rebus te sciat operam dare,*

Ego faxim ted Amphitruonem esse malis quam Jovem.

Here, if *malis* were independent, it must approximate that type of subjunctive ordinarily known as jussive. This is clear from the fact that negative sentences after *facere* in this sense ('see to it'), are introduced by *ne*; *malis*, therefore, cannot be potential ('would prefer'), but, if independent, it should approach, at least roughly, that class of usages in which some sort of order, command, or bidding is contained. But, to my mind, it is a sheer impossibility to attach any such sense to it; I can understand it only as the object of *faxim.*

Further instances of the same sort are :

Most. 322, visne ego te ac tu me amplexare ;

Asin. 644, proinde istud facias ipse quod faciamus nobis suades.

Here, if *faciamus* be taken as an independent subjunctive, we get the anomaly of an independent relative clause ;

Bacch. 864, faxo se haud dicat nactam quem derideat ;

Most. 68, Ervom tibi aliquis cras faxo ad villam adferat ;

Truc. 643, Ego faxo dicat me in diebus pauculis

Crudum virum esse ;

Amph. 257, velatis manibus orant, ignoscamus peccatum suum ;

Men. 540, Et palla et spinter faxo referantur ;

Pseud. 938, Nam si exoptem quantum dignu's tantum dent.

The foregoing examples are all instances of various persons and numbers of the present subjunctive which Morris regards as independent, but which really possesses validity only as related to a main verb whose content they explain. A complete list has not been attempted ; it would contain several score instances.

I pass to the instances of the imperfect which are claimed by Morris as independent and paratactic :

Stichus, 177, hoc nomen repperi eo quia paupertas fecit ridiculus forem. If *forem* be an independent subjunctive, the first question is, what it means. Who says *forem*? Gelasimus (the speaker in the passage) cannot say it, and it is equally impossible that a personified *Paupertas* should say it. It must, therefore, I think, be clear that *forem* is not an independent subjunctive, but a dependent one,—the object of *fecit*,—‘poverty made me take to jesting.’

ibid. 624, dixi equidem in carcerem ires. I suppose no one would hesitate to render this : ‘I told you to go to jail.’ Morris takes the *ires* as independent. But is it? If so, it must have been said by the speaker (the subject of *dixi*). But the speaker said nothing of the sort, he said, *i in carcerem* or *eas in carcerem*, of which *ires* is simply the dependent form projected into the past (*i. e.*, *dixi ires* is after the analogy of *dico eas*). Morris himself admits that the speaker really said *i* (p. 161). But how he can reconcile that with his statement that *ires* is a “quotation”

of *i* is to me quite inconceivable. A quotation, as I understand the word, is the reproduction of certain original language.

Bacch. 551,

Ille, quod in se fuit, accuratum habuit, quod posset mali,

Faceret in me, *inconciliaret* copias omnis meas. The words here claimed as independent subjunctives are *faceret* and *inconciliaret*. But what kind of subjunctives would these words be if independent? I do not ask for a label, but for some approximately similar recognized independent use. I have to confess that I can recall nothing. Morris says *faceret* expresses "a past intention." But can other independent imperfect subjunctives of "past intention" be cited from Latin?

Persa. 634, tactus lenost, qui rogarat, ubi nata esset, diceret. *Diceret* here is precisely similar to the *ires* of the *Stichus* passage.

Trin. 591, tandem impetravi abiret. If *abiret* here be an independent subjunctive, I must again confess my inability to recognize its kinship with any other independent subjunctives usually recognized as such.

Merc. 536, inter nos coniuravimus neuter stupri caussa caput limaret. What the lovers (the subject of *coniuravimus*) really said was, '*neuter limet*', and *neuter* . . . *limaret*, therefore, cannot be independent; it is simply another case of a dependent object clause thrown into the past, like *ires* in *dixi in carcerem ires*. The same is true of the two following passages:

ibid. 52, [pater] conclamitare . . . et praedicere omnes timerent mutuitanti credere. Obviously if anybody said *timerent*, it must have been the father; but he really said *timete* or *timeatis*; *timerent* is simply the indirect (*i. e.*, dependent) form of the father's words.

Mil. Glo. 54, at peditastelli quia erant, sivi viverent. *Viverent* here cannot be independent. The captain does not say *viverent*; in fact he does not say anything; *sivi viverent* is simply *sino vivant* thrown into the past. In *sino vivant*, the *vivant* was doubtless at the outset independent and paratactic. But *viverent* certainly could have been only secondary and analogical, never itself independent.

I pass to examples, of which the following is a typical illustration :

Merc. 107, *Eam me advexisse nolo resciscat pater.* Before proceeding to the bearings of sentences of this type upon Morris's general theory of Plautine parataxis, I give the other instances of this idiom :

Pseud. 436, *Vetus nolo faciat.* CA. At enim nequiquam nevis ;

Stichus, 734, *nolo obtaedescat ;*

Cas. 233, *nolo ames ;*

Pers. 245, *nolo ames ;*

Truc. 585, *vasa nolo auferant ;*

Most. 1176, *Nolo ores . . . Nolo, inquam, ores.* CA. Nequiquam nevis.

Now, in expressions of the type *nolo eam ames*, it might be theoretically possible to take the subjunctive as independent and paratactic, *i. e.*, 'love her, I want you to' = 'I want you to love her.' But when we come to apply the paratactic explanation to *nolo eam ames*, ('I don't want you to love her'), we at once get into difficulties. To explain this sentence as 'love her, I *don't* want you to', would obviously be the veriest nonsense. Morris, therefore, offers another explanation of expressions of this type. According to him (p. 298) *nolo ames* "begins with the prohibition *ne ames* and expands that by the insertion of *nolo* into *ne-nolo ames*." This explanation is highly ingenious, but it cannot be accepted, for the *ne* of *ne ames* is *nē*, while the *ne* of *nolo*,¹ *ne-vis*, *nevult* is *nē*, as attested a score of times in Plautine prosody. This *nē* is the same particle as seen in *nēqueo*, *nēscio*,² *nisi*, (*for nē-si*), *nēque*, *nēc*, and has no affinity for the subjunctive, being merely equivalent to

¹ *Nolo* may come either from **nē-volo* through **no-volo*, or from *nō-volo*. Those who accept the latter derivation, see in *nō*- the same form of the negative as in *nōn* (= *nō* + the affirmative particle *ne*). See Fowler, *The Negatives of the Indo-European Languages*, p. 24f. At all events it is phonetically impossible to derive *nolo* from *nē-volo*.

² Some regard the *e* in this word as long ; but the only positive evidence (that of the Romance languages) points to *ē*. This quantity is recognized by most recent scholars.

non. But quite apart from this, the idea of an adverb belonging to one verb combining with another verb to make a permanent compound seems strangely fantastic. Moreover we find an analogous idiom in *Merc.* 1004, *nihil opust resciscat*, 'there's no need of her knowing', which would still await explanation even were Morris's hypothesis concerning *nolo ames* tenable.

My own explanation for these clauses has long been this: *nolo ames* arises after the analogy of *volo ames*; similarly *nihil opust resciscat* arises after the analogy of *opust resciscat*.¹ Such analogical working in syntactical phenomena is widely prevalent. Cf. Eng., 'I don't want you to touch it', etc. (in the sense, 'I want you not to touch it'), after the analogy of 'I want you to touch it.'

Horace, *Odes*, iii. 2, 26,

Vetabo, qui Cereris sacrum

Volgarit arcanæ, sub isdem

Sit trabibus fragilemve mecum

Solvat phaselon.

Here *sit* and *solvat* can be explained only as used after the analogy of *iubeo* with the subjunctive as an object clause. *Veto* is the opposite of *iubeo*, and just as Eng. 'agree with' has called into being a 'differ with', so *iubeo sit* has prompted a *veto sit*. For obviously we should get the sheerest nonsense by taking *sit* and *solvat* in the above passage as independent and paratactic. The construction can give sense only when taken as secondary and dependent. Another illustration of the same tendency is seen in the substantive clause introduced by *tamquam*.² A normal type of the substantive *tamquam*-clause is found depending upon *accusare*; but after the analogy of this we find *excusare* followed by the *tamquam*-clause.

Now in just the same way I conceive expressions of the type *nolo ames* to have developed from *volo ames*. But this explanation involves consequences of far-reaching importance. If *nolo ames* is simply the product of analogy, then *ames* in *nolo ames* was

¹ This is not attested in Plautus, but occurs later.

² For a full discussion of this much neglected idiom, I would refer to my study in Wölfflin's *Archiv*, xi. 3.

no longer independent and paratactic. At the time when *nolo ames* came into existence in the way suggested, *ames* in *volo ames* must have already passed the stage of independence and parataxis, and have come to be felt simply as an object-clause. So *nihil opus resciscat* could not have arisen until in *opus est resciscat* (using this as a type merely) the *resciscat* had come to be felt as a dependent substantive clause.

But if this is so, one may well query whether any of the examples of so-called paratactic subjunctives in Plautus are anything more than *vestiges* of an original parataxis. For my own part I am firm in the belief that, for the subjunctive, the paratactic stage had been passed centuries before Plautus, just as it had well-nigh disappeared in the Greek of Homer's day. A very few cases occur which may, perhaps, be vindicated as paratactic; but in the main I am convinced that for Plautus, as for Terence, Cicero, and the later Latin, the great body of subjunctive expressions of the type claimed by Morris as paratactic were really felt as subordinate and dependent. I believe this because I am constrained, by the considerations just advanced, to believe it for expressions of the type *volo ames*. But if these were subordinate, I cannot see what type could possibly have been paratactic.

This view of the thoroughly subordinate nature (of most at least) of the subjunctives classed by Morris under the head of parataxis seems to me to derive additional support from the not infrequent occurrence of prolepsis in such expressions as :

Men. 955, *tu servos iube hunc ad me ferant*. Were *ferant* here independent, I cannot conceive that we should have its subject introduced proleptically in the *iube* clause. In other words prolepsis, it seems to me, is in itself a sign of subordination.

B.

Morris's Explanation of velim in expressions of the type : velim ignoscas, etc.

The traditional interpretation of *velim* in expressions of the above type makes it a potential subjunctive, *i. e.*, a 'should' subjunctive, the same kind as seen in the apodosis of conditional sentences of the type *si veniat, laeter*. In other words *velim* has been regarded as a softened *volo*, just as in English we often say, 'I should like', as being a less abrupt form of speech than 'I wish.' Some have even given the name 'subjunctive of modesty' to this special type of the potential,—unwisely, I think, inasmuch as the modal idea in *velim*, 'I would wish', and in *putem*, 'I should think', etc., is in no respect different from that in *laeter*, 'I should rejoice.' Both are true potentials; the 'modesty' lies exclusively in the meaning of the verb, not in the meaning of the mood. There is modesty in saying 'I should think', 'I should like', 'I should believe'; but there is no modesty in saying 'I should rejoice.'

Morris (*Am. Jour. Phil.*, xviii. (1897) pp. 137 f., 284 f.) dissents from the above view (or views) of *velim* and its compounds and explains the *velim* in such cases as an optative,—not (if I rightly understand his discussion) as a true optative meaning 'may I desire', but as an optative resulting from attraction to the accompanying optative subjunctive (p. 285), *i. e.*, *velim veniat* is held to stand for *volo veniat*, as a result of the attraction of *volo* to *velim* by *veniat*. This theory of attraction is very different from the theory of a true optative character for *velim* as apparently claimed by Morris in the early part of his paper (p. 139), but such as it is it involves several serious difficulties :

a. Velim occurs with the subjunctive (*i. e.*, without *ut*) 16 times in Plautus, and once with *ut* and the subjunctive. Against these 17 instances, we have 27 other instances of *velim* unaccompanied by the subjunctive, including 10 with the infinitive, 7 with participles and adjectives, 4 with a direct object and 6 absolute uses. As to *malim*, which Morris likewise regards as an attract-

ed optative, that is found twice with the simple subjunctive, and once with *ut* followed by the subjunctive. Against these 3 instances of *malim* there are 21 others where there is no accompanying subjunctive, including 13 with the infinitive, 4 with participles and adjectives, 1 with a direct object, and 3 absolute uses. *Nolim* does not occur accompanied by the subjunctive (either with *ut*, or without), but occurs 2 times with the infinitive, and once used absolutely; *pervelim* occurs twice with the infinitive and once with a participle. Of 74 occurrences, therefore, of *velim*, *malim*, *nolim*, *pervelim*, but 18 are accompanied by the subjunctive as against 54 that are not. Granting now that attraction may account for the subjunctive in these 18 instances, how are we to account for the subjunctive in the remaining 54 instances? So far as I see, no adequate explanation is offered. Morris, on p. 384, suggests that the use of *velim* with the infinitive is the result of analogy; but this is an improbable hypothesis. There is nothing whatever to show that *velim veniat* is older than *velim hoc* or *velim adire*; in fact the reverse is almost certainly true, and, if it is, the theory of analogy at once becomes untenable.

b. If the theory be correct that the notion of wishing involved in *veniat* has led to the use of the *velim* in *velim veniat*, then we should likewise expect a similar mood assimilation in orders preceded by *iubeo*, and in expressions of permission accompanied by *licet*, expressions of obligation accompanied by *oportet*, expressions of necessity accompanied by *necesse est*, i. e., we ought to expect *iubeam haec vasa auferant* instead of *iubeo auferant*; *liceat abeas* instead of *licet abeas*; *confiteare necesse sit*, instead of *necesse est*; *oporteat sit diligens*, instead of *oportet*. In fact, I see no limit to the legitimate extension which the subjunctive might reasonably be expected to have undergone along these lines, if Morris's theory of *velim* be correct. I can see no probability that attraction of the sort described by Morris should have been confined to *volo*, in association with optative subjunctives, if it really occurred in this latter case.

c. The theory of attraction, as an explanation of the syntactical use of one of two moods theoretically independent of each other (as assumed by Morris) is something entirely unsupported

by any linguistic phenomena with which I am acquainted. Nor can I believe that any feeling of a necessity for the differentiation of a volitive *veniat*, 'I want him to come' from an optative *veniat*, 'may he come' (Morris, p. 398), would have been likely to lead to any such attraction of the mood. The context could seldom have permitted any ambiguity; if it did not, no striving for a differentiation could have manifested itself. Even had there been ambiguity, the natural method of attaining clearness would have been the use of different verbs, not the assimilation of one verb to another. As a matter of fact, *volo* in the indicative occurs with some frequency in the sense of wishing (as opposed to willing), *e. g.* :

Pseud. 1122, *Volo a me accipiat.*

ibid. 322, BA. *Quid nunc vis?* CA. *Ut opperiare hos sex dies aliquos modo.*

Poen. 1197, *At enim hoc agas volo.*

Most. 1098, *Volo ut illi istuc confugiant.*

Morris's theory of *velim*, *nolim*, etc., moreover, seems entirely gratuitous. I cannot share his conviction that 'In a large majority of cases the sense excludes a potential meaning.' (By potential I assume the 'should meaning' is understood, *i. e.*, 'I should like', 'I should prefer', 'I should be loth.') A conscientious examination of the 74 cases embraced in Morris's list, fails, to my mind, to reveal a single instance in which these meanings do not meet the demands of the context. Morris finds *velim* particularly inappropriate in curses, etc.; yet in English we freely use the corresponding form of speech in such expressions, and say, 'I would like to have him lose all his money' (*velim omnes fortunas amittat*), 'I'd like to see him thrashed' (*velim verberet*), etc.

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